회의주의적 태도의 일관성 －자기논박 논변에 대한 퓌론회의주의의 대응－

Abstract

Vulnerability to the critique of self-refutation seems to be an inherent weak point of skepticism; in order to remain consistent in their skeptical conviction the skeptics are forced to be skeptical even about their own conviction. The ancient skeptics in the tradition of Western thought were well aware of this Achilles’ heel of their philosophy. Now, investigation on their effort to tackle the problem of self-refutation can throw light upon the most interesting feature of that kind of skepticism which is known as Pyrrhonism. The Pyrrhonists neither sidestep the attack nor attempt to devise a counterattack for the purpose of invalidating the logic of self-refutation. Rather, they accept willingly the consequence of self-refutation and, radicalizing the logic of self-refutation, make use of it, surprisingly enough, as the base for the perfection of skepticism. They believe that they can achieve this through interpreting the consequence of self-refutation quite differently from their opponents. The self-refutation argument, although devised as a means for coercing the skeptics to abandon their position, turns out to be only a halfway success, insofar as it cannot persuade them to assume the other alternative, that is, the position of the opponents; they can abandon the other alternative as well and advance further in the direction of complete suspension of judgment. How this dialectical advancement can be made is shown in their usage 회의주의적 태도의 일관성 31 of so-called quadrilemma, in the structure of which the process of typically skeptical thinking towards the ultimate goal is clearly reflected. In this paper I try to evaluate first the attempt of the Pyrrhonists to defend their usage of probative argument against the critique of self-refutation and then, analyzing the testimony about their usage of quadrilemma, to show where the pith of the skeptical thought is to be found.