영혼이 ‘하모니아(Harmonia)'라는 심미아스의 가설에 대한 고찰(『파이돈』 91 c6-95 a2)

Abstract

In the Phaedo(85 e3-86 d4) against Socrates’ thesis of the immortality of the soul, Simmias puts forward a hypothesis that the soul is a harmonia. Simmias’ soul-harmonia is introduced to the effect that it cannot exist apart when the elements of the body are dissolved by death, since the body is kept in tension and held together by hot and cold, dry and wet, and the like, and the soul is a blending and harmonia of these same things(86 b7-c2). Here Simmias’ harmonia is thought of as a kind of state of a lyre which is incapable of surviving the lyre itself. Yet the meaning of Simmias’ concept of the soul as harmonia is controversial. The word ‘harmonia’ is derived from the verb ‘harmozein’ (fit together), which denotes the idea of things being fitted together in an exact arrangement to make an integrated whole, and sometimes means "proportion," particularly in contexts where elements are mingled in proportion. First, I examine the meaning of harmonia, which can be interpreted either as (a) ratio, (b) a state, or (c) music. I argue that the harmonia of a lyre means the correct state of the strings of the lyre, that is to say (b). Simmias’ argument is concerned with the implications of the harmonised state of the lyre. Hence the harmonia of the parts of the lyre is harmonious only if the lyre is capable of performing music; then a mixture of bodily constituents is harmonious only if it is conducive to such purpose. Secondly, I discuss Socrates’ refutation of Simmias’ hypothesis in detail which has provoked considerable disagreements among commentators as to its validity. Socrates examines Simmias’ hypothesis by pointing out that the properties of a harmonia are determined by those of its elements(92 e4-93 a2). Socrates then induces Simmias to accept two new points, (1) that the soul does not admit of degrees(93 b4-7), and (2) that the soul is distinguished as good and bad(93 b8-c2). Hence Simmias is forced to admit that virtue is a harmonia and vice is lack of a harmonia; the good soul is a harmonia which is itself containing another harmonia within itself, whereas the vicious soul is not harmonia, in the sense that it contains no harmonia within itself. In fact Socrates argues from the premise that all souls are equally harmoniai to the conclusion that if virtue is a harmonia of the soul, all souls must equally virtuous, and therefore there can be no such thing as a vicious soul(93 d1- 94 b3). Yet the question whether Simmias’ harmonia admits of degrees or not is crucial for Socrates’ refutation of Simmias’ hypothesis. I first examine J. Burnet and A. E. Taylor’s thesis that no harmonia admits of degrees, and disclose their shortcomings. Then I discuss the modern standard interpretation that the nature of harmonia depends on the constituents which compose it. In particular I examine C. C. W. Taylor and D. Gallop’s view that there are two types of harmonia, physical and psychic; the soul is a harmonia of physical elements, whereas virtue and vice are harmoniai of psychic elements. To them then the thesis ‘no harmonia is more or less a harmonia than any other’ does not contradict the thesis ‘some things can have more harmonia than others’. Hence Taylor and Gallop claim that every physical harmonia is equally harmonia, no one physical harmonia more or less so than any other. Yet some physical harmoniai participate in psychological harmonia more or less than others, and that there is no contradiction in arguing that a physical harmonia lacks a psychological harmonia. I reveal the defects of their argument, and propose a new interpretation to the effect that the harmonia of each lyre is unique to it, and it admits of degrees when it is played. The rhythm and tone of the lyre’ harmonia when it is played could be thought of as the properties of the soul. Then this interpretation of Simmias’ hypothesis satisfies Socrates’ concept of the soul that it does not admit of degrees while it is distinguished as virtuous and vicious.