주희의 양지·양능(良知·良能) 개념 연구 ― 도덕의 선험적 원천과 자율성 ―

Abstract

This paper aims to explore various interpretations of Zhu Xi’s philosophy by analyzing his concepts of Liangzhi·Liangneng (良知·良能). Grounded in these concepts, the paper reveals that Zhu Xi’s philosophy echoes elements of Mengzi’s philosophy and underscores the autonomy of human beings within it. In Chapter 2, existing research and the notion of autonomy are scrutinized. Chapter 3 endeavors to elucidate Zhu Xi's interpretation of Mengzi's Liangzhi·Liangneng concepts. Through this exploration, the paper posits that while Mengzi emphasizes the priority, immanence, and universality of human morality, Zhu Xi adapts these moral traits through his conception of Liangzhi·Liangneng. Additionally, it delves into the philosophical significance of Liangzhi·Liangneng, with a specific focus on Lingxin (良心) and Mingde (明德). The paper argues that these concepts logically connect to a priori moral principles, from which Liangzhi·Liangneng derive. Chapter 4 further explicates the mental states indicated by Liangzhi·Liangneng, reinforcing the paper’s argument. It becomes evident that Liangzhi·Liangneng denote a human capacity representing a priori moral knowledge. Through this analysis, the paper asserts that these concepts serve as a priori source of Moral and demonstrate Zhu Xi’s philosophy as advocating for autonomous moral agents.