감사보수와 감사보고시차가 임원보수에 미치는 영향
The Effect of Audit fees and Audit Report Lag on Executive Compensation
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본 연구의 목적은 감사보고시차가 감사보수와 임원보수 간의 관련성에 미치는 영향을 검증함으로써 감사보수와 임원보수 간의 관련성이 엄격한 지배구조 가설에 기인된 결과임을 검증하고자 하였다. 본 연구기간은 2007년부터 2012년까지이며, 본 연구의 최종표본은 제 조건을 만족한기업-년 3,376개이다. 본 연구의 결과들은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 임원보수는 감사보고시차(AULAG)와 관련이 없었으나, 감사보수는 감사보고시차와 양(+) 의 관련성이 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 감사보수가 지배구조 가설(Mace 1971; Vancil 1987; Hermalin 2005; Engel et al. 2010)에 근거하여 감사보고시차와 밀접한 관련이 있는 것으로 해석된다. 둘째, 감사보고시차가 긴 경우에 임원보수는 이익조정과 관련이 없었으나, 감사보수는 이익조정과 양(+)의 관련성이 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 감사보고 지연이 보수를 높이기 위한 경영자의 이기적 행동과는 관련이 없고 이익조정이 의심되는 경영자 주장을 면밀히 조사하는 감사인의노력에 기인하는 것으로 보인다. 셋째, 감사보고시차가 긴 경우에 감사보수와 임원보수 간의 양(+)의 관련성이 강화되었다. 이러한 결과는 감사보수가 임원보수에 미치는 영향이 경영자 참호가설보다는 엄격한 지배구조 가설에 기인하는 것으로 해석되었다. 본 연구의 공헌점은 감사보고시차를 이용하여 감사보수와 임원보수 간의 관련성이 지배구조 가설에 기인함을 밝힌 최초의 연구라는 점이다. 이러한 결과는 감사보수와 임원보수 간의 인과관계를 설명하지 못한Wysocki(2010)의 연구에서 진일보한 것이다.
Abstract
The goal of this study is to verify the assumption that the relation between audit fees and executive compensation results from the strict governance hypothesis by examining the effect of the audit report lag on that relation. This study covers the 2007-2012 periods and the final sample is firm-year 3,376 observations that meet certain condition required for this study. These results of this study are as follows: First, it appears that executive compensation is not associated with the audit report lag but audit fees are positively related to the audit report lag. These can be interpreted that audit fees are closely linked to the audit report lag based the strict governance hypothesis (Mace 1971; Vancil 1987; Hermalin 2005; Engel et al. 2010). Second, it appears that executive compensation is not associated with earnings management but audit fees are positively associated with earnings management when the audit report lag becomes longer. These suggest that the audit report delay is not related to the managerial opportunistic behavior suspected of increasing its compensation but the more auditor effort to scrutinize thoroughly the management assertion. Last, it appears that the relation between audit fees and executive compensation is magnified when the audit report lag becomes longer. This may be interpreted that relation results from the strict governance hypothesis, rather than the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. To my knowledge, this study may be the first to determine the fact that the relation between audit fees and executive compensation results from the strict governance hypothesis by using the audit report lag. This study also compensates Wysocki(2010) that did not explain the causal relationship between audit fees and executive compensation.
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