복수경영자와 회계투명성

Abstract

[Purpose] The Co－CEO structure can utilize the diverse expertise, leadership, and competitiveness of multiple managers to facilitate rational decision－making. When mutual checks and monitoring functions operate effectively, inefficient decision－making can be mitigated. From this perspective, this study examines whether accounting transparency differs between firms with Co－CEOs and those with a single manager. [Methodology] This study employs a multiple regression analysis, with accounting transparency as the dependent variable and the presence of Co－CEOs as the explanatory variable. To account for differences in influence among managers, firms with Co－CEOs are categorized into three groups: firms composed entirely of controlling shareholders, firms composed entirely of professional managers, and firms composed of both controlling shareholders and professional managers. Additionally, the classified groups are re－analyzed based on the degree of competition within the management team, as measured by the frequency of managerial turnover. [Findings] Firms with Co－CEOs exhibit higher accounting transparency compared to firms with a single manager. Furthermore, firms where the management team consists entirely of either controlling shareholders or professional managers demonstrate higher accounting transparency than firms composed of both controlling shareholders and professional managers, as well as single－manager firms. Similar results are observed when analyzing groups based on managerial turnover rates. [Implications] This study distinguishes itself from prior research by measuring the impact of Co －CEOs on accounting transparency through the classification of management structures into three types, based on differences in influence among managers. Since the degree of competition within the management team is difficult to observe externally, the frequency of managerial turnover is used as a proxy to reanalyze the research hypothesis.