LBO와 손해
LBOs and Damages of a Corporation
0
조회
0
다운로드
11
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
LBO is an transaction where an acquiring company finances mainly with the funds borrowed from banks etc. and secured by a target company's asset. The Korean Court recognizes it as a shameless crime because the acquiring company never spends its money at the target company's expense. As such the Court regulates the transaction as crime of breach of trust under the criminal code. It results in severe decline of the transaction in a financial market. This paper would like to point out the problem of such approach. Especially it turns its light on the analysis of the condition, damages of the crime. Interpretation of damages is definitely a significant task in applying such crime to a specific case. However, it remains rarely analyzed. The court finds the acquiring company suffers damages by creating the security interests over its assets itself without any persuasive or convincing reasoning for it. It does interpret the realization of damages includes the risk of damages. Further, it invokes the Entity Theory to reach such finding. I would analyze the condition, damages more thoroughly. For such analysis, my question starts with “who is the trustee damaged?”. It links with the question, “To whom the director owes his/her fiduciary duty? to a corporation or to shareholders? what about the creditors?”. It goes further to the inquiry, “should the shareholders’ interest and the creditors’ interest be considered?”. While answering to these questions, I would like to criticize the Entity Theory pointing out misunderstanding and fallacy in it. Finally, I want to provide the guideline for a positive and successful LBOs from the view point of damages. Although LBOs is frequently used in an international market, it is still new to us. As the many countries are trying to find each country's own and appropriate rules and regulations, so we have to mole our own regulating tools. For this, experiencing as many cases as possible in real world is of essence. Current court’s attitude in regulating LBOs contains severe problem to make the transactions shrunk which means the farewell from such establishment of a reasonable regulating method. The aim of this paper is to secure the predictability in regulating LBOs by providing the outline of healthy LBOs’ aspect.
Abstract
LBO is an transaction where an acquiring company finances mainly with the funds borrowed from banks etc. and secured by a target company's asset. The Korean Court recognizes it as a shameless crime because the acquiring company never spends its money at the target company's expense. As such the Court regulates the transaction as crime of breach of trust under the criminal code. It results in severe decline of the transaction in a financial market. This paper would like to point out the problem of such approach. Especially it turns its light on the analysis of the condition, damages of the crime. Interpretation of damages is definitely a significant task in applying such crime to a specific case. However, it remains rarely analyzed. The court finds the acquiring company suffers damages by creating the security interests over its assets itself without any persuasive or convincing reasoning for it. It does interpret the realization of damages includes the risk of damages. Further, it invokes the Entity Theory to reach such finding. I would analyze the condition, damages more thoroughly. For such analysis, my question starts with “who is the trustee damaged?”. It links with the question, “To whom the director owes his/her fiduciary duty? to a corporation or to shareholders? what about the creditors?”. It goes further to the inquiry, “should the shareholders’ interest and the creditors’ interest be considered?”. While answering to these questions, I would like to criticize the Entity Theory pointing out misunderstanding and fallacy in it. Finally, I want to provide the guideline for a positive and successful LBOs from the view point of damages. Although LBOs is frequently used in an international market, it is still new to us. As the many countries are trying to find each country's own and appropriate rules and regulations, so we have to mole our own regulating tools. For this, experiencing as many cases as possible in real world is of essence. Current court’s attitude in regulating LBOs contains severe problem to make the transactions shrunk which means the farewell from such establishment of a reasonable regulating method. The aim of this paper is to secure the predictability in regulating LBOs by providing the outline of healthy LBOs’ aspect.
참고문헌 (22)
- 김병연, "차입매수(LBO)와 배임죄의 적용-신한LBO 및 한일합섬LBO 사례와 관련하여-", 상사법연구, 29(1), pp.217~252 (2010), 한국상사법학회
- 류전철, "배임죄에서 재산상 손해발생의 위험", 법학논총, 30(1), pp.107~130 (2010), 법학연구소
- 박상수, "LBO를 활용한 M&A 및 사례", 상장, 45 (2008), 한국상장회사협의회
- 박태현, "차입매수(Leveraged Buyout)에 있어서의 이사의 신인의무", 인권과 정의, (369), pp.195~229 (2007), 대한변호사협회
- 설민수, "M&A의 한 방법으로서 LBO에 대한 규제, 그 필요성과 방법, 그리고 문제점에 대한 다른 시각: 미국의 사해행위 취소와 한국의 배임죄 규제의 비교", 사법논집, 45 (2000), 법원도서관
- 송옥렬, "삼성 전환사채 저가발행과 배임죄의 성부", BFL, (36) (2009), 서울대학교 금융법센터
- 송종준, "會社法상 LBO의 背任罪 成否와 立法課題* -신한 및 한일합섬 LBO 판결을 계기로 하여-", 증권법연구, 10(2), pp.319~363 (2009), 한국증권법학회
- 안경옥, "배임죄에 있어서 실해발생의 위험", 비교형사법연구, (2) (2000), 한국비교형사법연구회
- 윤영신, "동양그룹의 합병형 LBO와 배임죄", BFL, (36) (2009), 서울대학교 금융법센터
- 이상훈, "LBO와 배임죄(下) - 손익관계와 출자환급적 성격 및 법인이익독립론을 중심으로 -", 법조, 57(5), pp.184~230 (2008), 법조협회
- 이상현, "LBO에 대한 정당한 규제-대법원 2004도7027 판결 비판적 검토-", 규제연구, 18(1), pp.107~141 (2009), 한국규제학회
- 이철송, "資本去來와 任員의 刑事責任", 인권과 정의, (359), pp.96~116 (2006), 대한변호사협회
- 정영철, "LBO와 배임죄성부: redux -부산지방법원 2009.2.10.선고 2008고합482", 516, 법조, pp.2009, 58(7)[DOI]
- 진현섭, "LBO와 이사의 배임죄 성립 여부", 인천법조, 8 (2007), 인천지방변호사회
- 최문희, "독일에서의 이사의 의무위반과 배임죄", BFL, (36) (2009), 서울대학교 금융법센터
- Ross, "엣센셜 기업재무(제6판)" (2008), 석정
- Regulation of Private Equity Backed Leveraged Buyout Activity in Europe, "Ellis Ferran", ~, pp.Law Working Paper No.84 (2007)
- Frederick Tung, "The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors", Emory L. J., 57, pp.809~ (2008)
- Margaret M Blair, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law", Virginia L. Rev., 85, pp.247~ (1999)
- "Second Council Directive, 77", 91, pp.1976, ~
- Stephen L. Schwarez, "Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors", Cardozo L. Rev., 17, pp.647~ (1996)
- Tom Ablum, "Leveraged Buyouts; The Ever Changing Landscape", DePaul Bus. L.J., 13, pp.109~ (2000)
