이사의 감시의무와 위험관리
Directors’ Duty to Monitor and Risk Management
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초록
21세기에 들어와 엔론, 월드콤 등 유명한 회사의 붕괴 또는 서브프라임 문제 등에 의한 세계적인 금융위기가 발생하고 있는데, 이러한 위기는 델라웨어주의 Caremark 판결에서 제시된 이사의 느슨한 감시책임기준에 일부 기인한다는 지적이 있다. 이처럼 금융위기는 이사회에 의한 감시의 중요성에 대한 강조를 환기시켰고, 이사의 회사에 대한 책임을 추궁하는 소송의 증가를 초래하였다. 그리하여 이사회의 감시에 있어서 적극적인 자세, 특히 위기관리프로그램은 위기에 대응하는 유익한 수단의 하나로서 고려되고 있다. 그런 까닭에 근년에 델라웨어법원은 임원이 문제 있는 큰 위험을 취하는 행위를 이사회가 받아들이지 말 것을 장려하고 있다. 또한 현재의 상황에 대해서는 이사의 권한과 주주에 대한 책임의 균형이 왜곡되고 있다는 비판이 있다. 그러나 이러한 이사회의 경영상 결정에 관한 책임문제와 마찬가지로 감시의 책임도 엄격한 제한에 따라야 한다는 이념에는 많은 저항이 있는 것으로 보인다. 이 글에서는 경영판단의 원칙의 적용과 위험을 취하는 것의 관련 및 위험관리와 이사의 감시의무의 관련성에 대하여 고찰하기로 한다.
Abstract
This Article uses recent events and litigation involving Citigroup to ask whether corporate law as created and enforced by state legislatures and courts such as the legislature and courts of the State of Delaware is capable of reducing the possibility of a replay of the recent financial crisis. Specifically, after presenting the events at Citigroup as a case study demonstrating the excessive risk-taking activities of financial institutions, this Article outlines generally the tools available to the law to limit the sort of excessive risk-taking that occurred at Citigroup and elsewhere. These tools include regulation of business activities, capital requirements, rules for executive compensation, imposing liability on directors and officers for unreasonable risks, and rules governing the selection of directors and officers. This Article then divides these tools into those addressed by banking law (regulation of business activities and capital requirements), and those for which state corporate law plays a role (compensation limits, personal liability for unreasonable risks, and director and officer selection). This Article then uses the results from the recent Citigroup litigation as a case study in the limited willingness of state legislatures and courts to use the important tools allocated, at least in part, to corporate law to curb excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. Specifically, the article contrasts the weaker standards and application for finding directors and officers liable for their inattention to risk in Citigroup with the probable analysis under a banking law or other regulatory regime. This Article also explains why this result is inherent in a regime in which directors and shareholders select which state’s corporate law will govern. The article concludes with a discussion of normative implications. This essay analyzes the potential benefits of improved risk management practices, commonly called enterprise risk management (ERM), and the potential barriers to implementing meaningful ERM at U.S. firms. ERM is an integrated risk management framework that seeks to improve knowledge of and communication about potential risks throughout the firm, starting with the board and senior management team. Indeed, the board and senior management team are vital to creating a risk culture. The essay considers the impact of boardroom dynamics and U.S. corporate culture on risk management practices. The essay further considers whether regulation or a different approach is needed to encourage U.S. corporations to invest the necessary human capital in meaningful ERM.
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