국회의원 공약이행에 영향을 미치는 정치적 요인 분석
Why Do or Do Not the Members of the National Assembly Carry Out Their Campaign Promises?
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 연구는 국회의원들의 공약이행에 미치는 정치적 요인을 알기 위해서 한국매니페스토 실천본부에서 조사한 제19대 국회의원의 공약이행 평가 자료를 기초로 개별 지역구 국회의원들의 공약이행률을 검토하고 국회의원 선거공약과 정당공약과의 일치율, 국회의원의 개인적 역량과 지역구 특성이 공약이행률에 미치는 효과를 회귀분석을 통해 분석했다. 그 결과 국회의원의 선거공약이 양대 정당(새누리당과 민주통합당) 공약에 모두 제시될수록 공약이행률이 높아진 것으로 나타났다. 반면에 국회의원의 선거공약이 새누리당이든 민주통합당이든 어떤 한 정당의 공약하고만 일치할 경우에는 공약이행률이 높아지지는 않았다. 이러한 결과는 제19대 국회에서 국회선진화법이 시행됨으로써 양대 정당 중 어느 한 당의 반대가 있다면 제도적으로 어떤 공약도 시행되기 어려운 현실을 반영한 것이며 유권자들과의 약속을 지키는 책임정치의 실현을 위해서는 정당 간의 정치적 합의가 중요하다는 것을 증명하고 있다.
Abstract
This article examines the political determination of incongruence between campaign promises and the subsequent legislative behavior in the 19th National Assembly of the Republic of Korea by analyzing Korea Manifesto Center’s evaluation report for the fulfillment of campaign promises. As a result, we find that individual campaign promises are likely to be carried out if they are included in both major political parties’ manifesto that were published during the election campaign. In other words, individual campaign promises are less likely to carried out if they dissent from the policy position of one of the major parties. It shows that the major opposition party, acting as a veto player, can prevent or delay the enactment of legislation and public policy suggested by the ruling party. Thus, a members of the National Assembly needs approval of major party leaders and of an absolute majority of the National Assembly to carry out his campaign promises.
참고문헌 (31)
- 정회옥, "19대 총선에서 나타난 매니페스토 정책선거의 현실과 한계", 한국정당학회보, 11(2), pp.125~155 (2012), 한국정당학회
- 조진만, "한국 매니페스토 정책선거의 과제와 제도적 개선 방안", 한국정당학회보, 7(2), pp.111~136 (2008), 한국정당학회
- 전진영, "국회선진화법은 국회를 선진화시켰는가?", 현대정치연구, 8(1), pp.99~125 (2015), 현대정치연구소
- 한국매니페스토실천본부, "매니페스토본부, 19대 총선공약 완료율 51.24%로 분석", 한국매니페스토실천본부, ~ (2016)
- Aldrich, John H., "Why Parties? A Second Look" (2011), The University of Chicago Press
- Akirav, Osnat, "Re-election: Different Skills for Different Roles", Government and Opposition, 50(1), pp.90~118 (2015)
- Bowler, Shaun, "Private Members’ Bills in the UK Parliament: Is There an ‘Electoral Connection’?", The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(4), pp.476~494 (2010)
- Cox, W. Gary, "Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House" (2007), Cambridge University Press
- Cross, Willam, "Personalization of Campaigns in an SMP System: The Canadian Case", Electoral Studies, 39, pp.306~315 (2015)
- Downs, Anthony, "An Economic Theory of Democracy" (1957), Harper and Row
- Kellermann, Michael, "Electoral Vulnerability, Constituency Focus, and Parliamentary Questions in the House of Commons", The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2015)
- King, Gary, "Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending", The American Political Science Review, 87(3), pp.744~750 (1993)
- Mansergh, Lucy, "Election Pledges, Party Competition, and Policymaking", Comparative Politics, 39(3), pp.311~329 (2007)
- Mayhew, David. R., "Congress: The Electoral Connection" (1974), Yale University Press
- Miller, William E., "Constituency Influence in Congress", The American Political Science Review, 57(1), pp.45~56 (1963)
- Pétry, François, "Do They Walk Like They Talk?", pp.65~80 (2009), Springer
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., "The Chain of Responsiveness", Journal of Democracy, 15(4), pp.91~105 (2004)
- Riker, William H., "Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice" (1988), Waveland Press, Inc
- Ringquist, Evan J., "Lies, Damned Lies, and Campaign Promises? Environmental Legislation in the 105th Congress", Social Science Quarterly, 85(2), pp.400~419 (2004)
- Ringquist, Evan J., "Campaign promises, democratic governance, and environmental policy in the US Congress", Policy Studies Journal, 41(2), pp.365~387 (2013)
- Royed, Terry J., "Policy Promises and Policy Action in the United States and Great Britain, 1979-1988", Doctor, pp.1988
- Royed, Terry J, "Testing the mandate model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher eras", British Journal of Political Science, 26(1), pp.45~80 (1996)
- Schwarz, Daniel, "Pre-Election Positions and Voting Behaviour in Parliament: Consistency among Swiss MPs", Swiss Political Science Review, 16(3), pp.533~564 (2010)
- Sulkin, Tracy, "Campaign Appeals and Legislative Action", The Journal of Politics, 71(3), pp.1093~1108 (2009)
- Tsebelis, George, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism", Brithsh Journal of Political Science, 25(3), pp.289~325 (1995)
- Tsebelis, George, "Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work" (2002), Princeton University Press
- Thomson, Robert, "Citizens’ Evaluations of the Fulfillment of Election Pledges: Evidence from Ireland", The Journal of Politics, 73(1), pp.187~201 (2011)
- Thomson, Robert, "Explaining the Fulfillment of Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Government Institutions", Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014)
- Traber, Denise, "Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament: the Electoral Connection", The Journal of Legislative Studies, 20(2), pp.193~215 (2014)
- Van Holsteyn, "Demoted Leaders and Exiled Candidates:Disentangling Party and Person in the Voter’s Mind", Electoral Studies, 29(4), pp.628~635 (2010)
- Zittel, Thomas, "Constituency Candidates in Comparative Perspective-How Personalized Are Constituency Campaigns, Why, and Does It Matter?", Electoral Studies, 39, pp.286~294 (2015)