성공하지 못한 벤처투자에 관한 법적 분석 －실리콘밸리 벤처캐피탈과 창업자 사이의 긴장관계를 중심으로－
Exit from a Silicon Valley Startup with Scant Growth: Lopsided, but fair enough?
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본고는 우리나라에서도 문제될 수 있는 벤처기업 내 VC와 창업자 사이의 이익충돌이 실리콘밸리의 벤처기업에서 어떻게 규율되는지를 분석하였다. 스타트업은 실적이 없는 초기 단계 기업이라는 점에서 정보불균형으로 인한 기회주의적 행태의 위험이 매우 크다. 일차적으로 그러한 위험은 외부 투자자들이 부담한다. 실리콘밸리의 VC는 단계별로 여러 우선권이 부착된 우선주를 발행 받고 임직원을 스타트업 이사회에 파견하는 방식으로 창업자의 기회주의적 행동을 규율한다. 반면 벤처투자가 회를 거듭하여 이루어지게 되면 점점 VC의 지배력이 커진다. 이 단계를 지나면 이제 반대로 창업자가 VC의 기회주의적 행태의 위험에 노출된다. 물론 일반적으로는 창업자와 VC의 이해관계는 상당 부분 겹친다. 그런데 사업이 아주 실패도 성공도 아닌 상황, 즉 VC가 투자한 원금을 초과하는 큰 수익을 회수할 수 있을 정도로 주식가치가 성장하지 못한 상황에서 투자금 회수를 위한 중간매각이 이루어지는 경우에는, 그 매각 시점과 관련하여 이해관계가 달라질 수 있다. VC가 보유한 잔여재산분배 우선권과 펀드의 존속기간 때문이다. 이처럼 VC와 보통주주 사이에 이익이 충돌한다고 인정되면, 스타트업 이사회의 구조상 이사회 과반수가 비독립적, 즉 이익이 충돌하는 상황이었다고 보게 될 가능성이 상당히 높다. 물론 이익충돌이 존재한다고 하여 거래가 불공정한 것은 아니고, 결국 결론을 가르는 것은 ‘가격의 공정성’이다. 스타트업과 같이 장기간 실적이 있지도 않은 비상장회사의 ‘공정한 기업가치’라는 것은 꽤나 넓은 폭의 범위로만 특정할 수 있을 것인바, 실제 거래의 기준으로 삼았던 스타트업의 기업가치가 그 공정한 기업가치의 범위 안에 들어온다면, 전체적으로 공정한 것이었다고 보게 될 가능성이 크다.
Abstract
As venture investment market is going through recession, post-money valuations of many startups may not meet the expectations. When they don’t, inherent conflict within VC-backed startups can break surface and become a legal quagmire. This article introduces and analyzes the conflicts of interests between a founder and venture capitals (VCs) in a typical Silicon Valley startup and how they are governed by Delaware law. First, this article contemplates power dynamics within VC-backed startups. To mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems prevalent within startups, VCs in Silicon Valley use various contract mechanisms such as staged financing, convertible preferred shares with liquidation preferences, and a number of governance rights. As a startup goes through multiple stages of financings, however, the one who grips the rudder of a startup gradually becomes the VCs, not founders. Some original founders resign from CEO as the startup matures, and VCs retain near-majority of board seats. Outside directors may also be “friends” of VC partners. Second, the article analyzes how this power dynamics become a fiduciary duty case. Founders and VCs, though different as common and preferred shareholders, have similar interests overall: Both want the company to grow. However, unlike founders, VCs have limited timetable and multiple portfolio companies. If a startup shows unclear potential for growth, the VCs will rather concentrate on another company in their portfolios that seems to have brighter potential. Option-like payout structure of a convertible preferred stock with liquidation preference intensifies this problem: If the startup has not grown far enough and its sale price can just meet the liquidation preferences, vague prospect of growth does not excite the preferred stockholders at all. There, VCs will proceed with a fire sale of the startup (using its board control) even if the founders may want a stand-alone growth—even when it is feasible. Third, the article shows how those cases are dealt with in Delaware courts. Due to the conflicted nature of VC-directors and some outside directors, most cases regarding VC-backed startups have been reviewed under the Delaware’s most stringent standard, the Entire Fairness standard. However, the actual outcome has not been bad for defendants. Many of them tend to fall short of the first throng of that standard, namely the “fair dealing” element. Still, several cases were held entirely fair because the prices of those deals were fair. This trend is in line with Delaware case law that has constantly confirmed that fair price in fiduciary litigation can only be recognized by some range of prices (unlike appraisal cases), and fair procedure is a tool for securing fair price.
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