Review on Introducing Dual Class Share Structure in Korean Market
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초록
This research aims at reviewing the possibility of justifying dual class share system in the corporate governance. To achieve the purpose, the paper analyzes the disputes of dual class share principle through literature research method. The contents of the paper are reviewing the dual class share structure as ways to overcome the difficulties of technology companies’ financing; disadvantages that would be the risk of founder’s extracting private benefit and failure of protecting public investors; justification that would be relieving the anti-competitive effects from common ownership of institutional investors. If the structure should be introduced like the preferred share, despite the clear rejection of the Korean Commercial Act Article 369.1, due to the lack of public investors’ protection, controlling shareholders’ adequate liability, it cannot be justified.
Abstract
This research aims at reviewing the possibility of justifying dual class share system in the corporate governance. To achieve the purpose, the paper analyzes the disputes of dual class share principle through literature research method. The contents of the paper are reviewing the dual class share structure as ways to overcome the difficulties of technology companies’ financing; disadvantages that would be the risk of founder’s extracting private benefit and failure of protecting public investors; justification that would be relieving the anti-competitive effects from common ownership of institutional investors. If the structure should be introduced like the preferred share, despite the clear rejection of the Korean Commercial Act Article 369.1, due to the lack of public investors’ protection, controlling shareholders’ adequate liability, it cannot be justified.
참고문헌 (13)
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