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차등의결권 주식은 기업가치를 제고하는가?

Do Dual-Class Shares Enhance Corporate Value?

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주제분류경영학

초록

우리나라에서는 1997년 금융위기 이후 기업 관련 정책 중 중요한 부분이 기업의 지배구조이다. 최근까지도 핵심 개혁대상으로 이 문제가 끊임없이 논의되어 왔다. 그러나 이런 우려에도 불구하고정치권과 벤처업계는 벤처기업의 경영권 보호와 자금조달을 활성화하기 위한 방안으로 차등의결권을도입하려는 시도를 계속해서 추진하고 있다. 이에 차등의결권 도입이 과연 기업가치에 의미있는 영향을미치고 있는 지 면밀히 검토해야 할 시기가 도래한 것으로 여겨진다. 따라서 본 연구는 차등의결권과기업가치 관련 국내외 선행연구들을 면밀히 검토하여 차등의결권 도입에 따른 영향을 분석함으로써정책적인 제언을 하는 것을 주된 목표로 한다. 이를 위하여 간접적으로나마 차등의결권과 관련된 국내 선행연구들을 먼저 검토해보고, 실질적으로차등의결권을 도입한 해외 기업들의 가치변화를 분석함으로써 이 제도의 도입이 우리 기업 및 시장에미칠 영향을 분석하고자 한다. 국내외 관련 연구들을 살펴본 결과 차등의결권 도입이 기업가치에부정적인 영향을 미친다는 것이 다수이다. 즉, 비상장벤처기업을 상대로 1주 10의결권 이내의 차등의결권부여가 가능한 제도를 도입하려는 정부 및 벤처협회의 주장과는 다르게 해외의 많은 사례들처럼기업가치가 하락할 수 있다. 이에 따라 이 제도를 채택한 기업이 상장할 경우 일반(소액)주주들은상대적으로 불리한 입장에 놓일 수 있다는 문제점을 인지할 필요가 있다. 이를 통해 본 연구는 차등의결권을 도입하려는 정책당국 등에게 차등의결권 도입효과와 이에 따른시사점을 제공하고자 한다.

Abstract

In Korea, an important part of corporate-related policies after the 1997 financial crisis is corporate governance. Until recently, this issue has been constantly discussed as a core reform target. Despite the concerns, however, attempts by politicians and venture businesses to introduce Dual-Class Shares as a way to protect management rights and boost financing of venture companies have continued. Accordingly, it is believed that the time has come to closely examine whether the introduction of them has a meaningful effect on corporate value. Therefore, this study aims to make policy suggestions by reviewing previous studies related to them and corporate value and analyzing the impact of the introduction of them. To this end, we try to analyze the impact of the introduction of this system on Korean companies and the market by first examining domestic prior studies related to them, at least indirectly, and then analyzing the change in the value of foreign companies that actually introduced them. As a result, many say that the introduction of Dual-Class Shares negatively affects corporate value. In other words, unlike the claims of the government and venture associations to introduce a system that can grant them up to 10 voting rights per share to unlisted venture companies, the corporate value may decline as in many cases abroad. Accordingly, it is necessary to recognize the problem that general (small) shareholders may be placed at a relatively disadvantageous position when a company adopting this system goes public.

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