차등의결권주에 관한 연구 - 도입필요성을 중심으로 -
A Study on the Disparate Voting Rights Stock
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This paper emphasizes the need to adopt the disparate voting rights stock. Disparate voting rights stock has many utilities, including being used as a defensive tactics. The one-share, one-vote rule, which makes it difficult to adopt the disparate voting rights stock is not an absolute one. Debates on the regulation of disparate voting rights stock in U.S.A. show that the one-share, one vote rule is not a problem of public policy, but merely a problem of contract. The reasons why we should adopt the disparate voting rights stock are, to ①eliminate the counter-discrimination of domestic companies with regard to defensive tactics, ② be used by closely-held corporations, and ③ be used as a substitute of pyramidal ownership or circular ownership structure. But, voting rights of general shareholders can be diluted with a disparate voting rights stock. So the paper suggests: ① Disparate voting rights stock be issued with a provision in the certificate of incorporation. ② Maximum numbers of voting rights and the maximum amounts of disparate voting rights stock be restricted. This paper consists of as follows: Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Concepts and utilities of disparate voting rights stock Ⅲ. Disparate voting rights stock and the 'one-share, one-vote rule' Ⅳ. Debates on the regulation of disparate voting rights stock in U.S.A. Ⅴ. Need to adopt the disparate voting rights stock Ⅵ. Conclusion
Abstract
This paper emphasizes the need to adopt the disparate voting rights stock. Disparate voting rights stock has many utilities, including being used as a defensive tactics. The one-share, one-vote rule, which makes it difficult to adopt the disparate voting rights stock is not an absolute one. Debates on the regulation of disparate voting rights stock in U.S.A. show that the one-share, one vote rule is not a problem of public policy, but merely a problem of contract. The reasons why we should adopt the disparate voting rights stock are, to ①eliminate the counter-discrimination of domestic companies with regard to defensive tactics, ② be used by closely-held corporations, and ③ be used as a substitute of pyramidal ownership or circular ownership structure. But, voting rights of general shareholders can be diluted with a disparate voting rights stock. So the paper suggests: ① Disparate voting rights stock be issued with a provision in the certificate of incorporation. ② Maximum numbers of voting rights and the maximum amounts of disparate voting rights stock be restricted. This paper consists of as follows: Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Concepts and utilities of disparate voting rights stock Ⅲ. Disparate voting rights stock and the 'one-share, one-vote rule' Ⅳ. Debates on the regulation of disparate voting rights stock in U.S.A. Ⅴ. Need to adopt the disparate voting rights stock Ⅵ. Conclusion
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