중국의 거대 플랫폼에 대한 반독점과 데이터 독점 규제: 알리바바 사례를 중심으로

Abstract

The hypothetical argument of this paper is as follows. Regulations on large platforms began in earnest in China in late 2020. The New Brandeis Movement in the United States also denies the traditional view. In its view, even if consumer welfare improves, if it poses a threat to the democratic system, it should be recognized as a monopoly. It argues for regulations on large platforms such as Amazon. The situation in China is different. China has supported the development of the platforms by imitating the US Silicon Valley model. In China, few anti-trust measures were explicitly taken against Chinese companies until the first half of 2020. Then, it began to judge that the monopoly of the huge platform threatened the "system of the Communist Party of China." Moreover, the state has begun to recognize the data power of monopoly platforms as a threat to the system. Sometimes the state has begun to recognize that security of the platforms' data is important to national security. In the meantime, from the second half of 2020, anti-trust measures were taken in earnest and measures were taken to share exclusive data of the platforms. In other words, in order to strengthen the Xi Jinping system, the state has shifted from the past Silicon Valley model to a regulatory model for platforms. In this process, the platform problem of Chinese characteristics may work. Starting in the second half of 2020, there are various cases of high-intensity regulations on platforms. In order to verify these hypothetical arguments, it is considered appropriate for this study to select and study cases that more imply the goals and measures of high-intensity regulations on platforms under the Xi Jinping system. Currently, high-intensity regulations are underway on platforms such as Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, and Meituan. In this paper, Alibaba is selected as an example that has more diverse meanings of high-intensity regulation and a case study is conducted. The reason why Alibaba was chosen as an example is that first, it contains the most anti-trust regulations on platforms and regulations on data power. This contrasts with Didi Chuxing cases related to data security issues, Tencent cases related to normalization of education through restrictions on youth game use, and Meituan cases related to platform worker protection and antitrust regulations. Second, this is because it is the most representative example of recent high-intensity regulations on large platforms. This is because Alibaba is not only the largest penalty so far, but also the strongest regulatory case in view of data sharing and nationalization measures.