중국의 플랫폼 고강도 규제기간에서 이해당사자와 국가전략 : 메이퇀 사례를 중심으로

Abstract

In China, after Ma Yun's financial denunciation in October 2020, national regulations on large platforms began in earnest. The transition to the state's high-intensity regulation has various backgrounds and factors. One of the factors of huge platform regulation is platform conflict. In other words, the conflict between platforms and suppliers, consumers, and workers has intensified. As the platform develops into a monopoly and platform conflict intensifies, the state readjusts their relations as an aspect of national regulation. Meituan, a food delivery platform, has also been subject to administrative punishment and fines from the state in October 2021. At the time of regulatory measures, Meituan's monopoly was stronger than Alibaba and Tencent. The degree of conflict with platform participants was not weaker than that of other huge platforms. This is confirmed in various social media related to Meituan and platform participants even before the national regulatory measures in October. Due to netizens' reactions and actual conflict situations, Meituan appears a little different from the huge platforms of U.S. As Lina Khan said, the US giant platform does not undermine consumers' welfare in that it cuts consumption prices even at the expense of suppliers in a two-sided market. However, the case shows that the situation in China may be different. In my paper, it can be seen that the Meituan case differs from the US giant platform in that it transfers the burden not only to suppliers and riders but also to consumers.