아리스토텔레스에 있어서 습관화로서의 도덕교육

Abstract

Does one become a good man by behaving well? When not enough differentiated, a circular argument results from it unavoidably: one must be already a good man bevor behaving well. Such a problem is arouse chiefly from unconscious identification of moral philosophical perspectives and moral educational ones. While moral philosophy is concerned primarily with the "being good", moral education focuses relatively on the phenomenon of the "becoming good". To notice it well is not insignificant, although it is frequently overlooked in the academic discourses about moral education. Here will be made an attempt to differentiate moral philosophical interests and moral educational ones by leaning on the Aristotelian Ethics. Aristoteles' notion of habituation is regarded as an educational one, which means more than a mechanical process to achieve habits of doing well. Habituation differs from mimicry and understanding, whereas practice(praxis) differs from arts(poiesis) and intellectual insight(theoria). The latter ones are inclined to represent only one of the two aspects of activities, as it were, adaption without the actor himself or discernment without concerns about acting. But the former is characterized by an ambivalent experience which consists of externalizing of one's own inner self(intention) and internalizing of outer laws(insight). Therefore habituation can stand for the principle and process of moral education, through which one forms himself as a good person. It is moreover to establish as the process to make possible an ethical activity in the full sense, namely a both voluntary and intellectual one. In that sense, it stands for the experience, through which one can become good without presupposing to be a good man. To put it more concretely, habituation is here exposed as a combined self-experience of hypothetical experimentation of the inner self on the one hand and externalization(systematization) of such experiments into laws on the other hand.