본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

인간의 협조적 행위와 강한 상호성에 대한 문헌연구

A Survey on Human Cooperative Behavior and Strong Reciprocity

이상훈|황재홍|조필규
한국사회경제학회 (Korean Association for Political Economy)|2014.10|사회경제평론 (The Review of Social & Economic Studies)|제45호|pp. 7-46|DOI 10.17964/rses.2014..45.7

0

조회

0

다운로드

9

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

사회적 선호Social preferenceCooperative behavior강한 상호성협조적 행위Strong reciprocity
주제분류경제학

초록

본 논문은 강한 상호성을 둘러싼 여러 가지 논쟁들을 소개하고 있다. 강한 상호성 가설은 여러 실험 결과들을 토대로 인간이 이기적 선호 외에도타인을 고려한 선호를 갖고 있다고 주장한다. 그리고 강한 상호성 가설은 집단선별과 유전자 문화 공진화를 통해서 사회적 선호의 진화적 기원을 설명하고 있다. 그러나 실험실에서 나타나는 협조적 행위가 반드시 사회적 선호에 의해 설명되는 것은 아니라는 반론이 여전히 제기되고 있다. 이에 따르면, 인간의 협조적 행위는 사실상 장기적인 관점에서의 이기심에 의해 설명될 수 있으며, 일회적 상호작용에서 나타나는 협조적 행위는 인간이 과거의습성을 현대의 변화된 환경에 잘못 적용함으로써 나타나게 된다는 것이다이에 대해서 강한 상호성 가설은 이들 반론이 익명적이고 일회적인 상호작용에서도 광범위하게 발견되는 협조적 행위를 설명할 수 없을 뿐만 아니라인간의 인지 메커니즘은 인류의 생존의 적합성을 높이도록 진화했다는 점에서 부적응 가설은 설득력이 떨어진다고 주장한다.

Abstract

This article introduces the debate on the concept of strong reciprocity. Basedon experimental results, the theory of strong reciprocity claims that humans haveother-regarding preferences as well as self-regarding preferences. By using thetheories of group selection and gene-culture coevolution, strong reciprocity theoryexplains the mechanism through which strong reciprocity can evolve. On the otherhand, some theorists argue that cooperative behavior observed in experiments isnot necessarily associated with social preferences. They hold that humancooperation can be explained on the basis of self-interest, and strong reciprocityrepresents an evolutionary maladaptation. The strong reciprocity theorists point out that the counter-argument cannot explain cooperation widely observed in anonymous one-shot settings, and the maladaptation hypothesis is not convincing since humans’ recognition mechanism has been evolved for survival.

참고문헌 (67)

  1. 이규상, "‘큰 그림’을 찾아: 경제현상과 (실험)경제학자들이 하는 일에 대한 버논 스미스의 진화론적 해석", 사회경제평론, (39), pp.7~46 (2012), 한국사회경제학회
  2. 최정규, "사회적 선호와 제도: 문헌 연구", 사회경제평론, (32), pp.133~165 (2009), 한국사회경제학회
  3. 최정규, "이타적 협조 전략의 진화 가능성을 둘러싼 제 가설 검토: 유유상종 원리를 중심으로 한 재해석", 사회경제평론, (35), pp.309~337 (2010), 한국사회경제학회
  4. 최정규, "반사회적 처벌, 그리고 정상적 처벌과 협조적 전략의 공진화", 사회경제평론, (41), pp.69~96 (2013), 한국사회경제학회
  5. Alexander, R. D., "The Biology of Moral Systems" (1987), Aldine Transaction
  6. Andreoni, J., "Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments", Journal of Public Economics, 37, pp.291~304 (1988)
  7. Andreoni, J., "Cooperation in PublicGoods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?", American Economic Review, 85(4), pp.891~904 (1995)
  8. Berg, J., "Trust, Reciprocity and Social History", Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp.122~142 (1995)
  9. Binmore, K., "Why do People Cooperate?", Politics Philosophy Economics, 5(1), pp.81~96 (2006)
  10. Bolton, G. E., "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition", American Economic Review, 100, pp.166~193 (2000)
  11. Bowles, S., "The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution" (2012), Cambridge University Press
  12. Boyd, R., "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment", Proceedings of National Academy of Science of USA, 100(6), pp.3531~3535 (2003)
  13. Boyd, R., "Culture and the Evolutionary Process" (1985), The University of Chicago Press
  14. Boyd, R., "The Evolution of Ethnic Markers", Cultural Anthropology, 2(1), pp.27~38 (1987)
  15. Burnham, T. C., "Toward a Neo-Darwinian Synthesis of Neoclassical and Behavioral Economics", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 90(Supplement), pp.S113~S127 (2013)
  16. Burnham, T. C., "The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation", Analyse & Kritik, 27(1), pp.113~135 (2005)
  17. Dawkins, R., "Selfish Gene" (1976), Oxford University Press
  18. Decety, J., "The Neural Bases of Cooperation and Competition: an fMRI Investigation", Neuroimaga, 23(2), pp.744~751 (2004)
  19. de Quervain, D. J., "The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment", Science, 305, pp.1254~1258 (2004)
  20. Fehr, E., "Why Social Preferences Matter: the Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives", Economic Journal, 112, pp.C1~C33 (2002)
  21. Fehr, E., "The Nature of Human Altruism", Nature, 425, pp.785~791 (2003)
  22. Fehr, E., "Third Party Punishment and Social Norm", Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, pp.63~87 (2004)
  23. Fehr, E., "Moral Sentiments and Material Interst: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life" (2005), MIT Press
  24. Fehr, E., "Strong Recirpocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms", Human Nature, 13(1), pp.1~25 (2002)
  25. Fehr, E., "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence", American Economic Review, 95(2), pp.346~351 (2005)
  26. Fehr, E., "Reciprocity and Economics: the Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans", European Economic Review, 42(3-5), pp.845~859 (1998)
  27. Fehr, E., "Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp.159~181 (2000)
  28. Fehr, E., "Altruistic Punishment in Humans", Nature, 415, pp.137~140 (2002)
  29. Fehr, E., "Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation" (2004), The MIT Press
  30. Fehr, E., "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, pp.437~460 (1993)
  31. Fehr, E., "Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets", European Economic Review, 42, pp.1~34 (1998)
  32. Fehr, E., "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp.817~868 (1999)
  33. Fehr, E., "Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity" (2006), Elsevier
  34. Fehr, E., "Eyes on us, but Nobody Cares: Are Eye Cues Relevant for Strong Reciprocity?", Proceedings of Royal Society Biological Science, 277, pp.1315~1323 (2010)
  35. Forsythe, R. L., "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 3, pp.347~369 (1994)
  36. Fudenberg, D., "Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation", Journal of Public Economics, 9(1-2), pp.78~86 (2010)
  37. Gale, J., "Learning to be Imperfect: the Ultimatum Game", Games and Economic Behavior, 8, pp.56~90 (1995)
  38. Gintis, H., "The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Altruism: Genes, Culture, and the Intermalization of Norms", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 220, pp.407~418 (2003)
  39. Gintis, H., "The Genetic Side of Gene-culture Coevolution: Intermalization of Norms and Prosocial Emotion", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, pp.57~67 (2004)
  40. Gintis, H., "Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans", Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, pp.153~172 (2003)
  41. Gintis, H., "Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human Morality", Social Justice Research, 21(2), pp.241~253 (2008)
  42. Güth, W., "An Experimental Anaysis of Ultimatum Bargaining", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), pp.367~388 (1982)
  43. Hamilton, W. D., "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior Ⅰ and Ⅱ", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, pp.1~52 (1964)
  44. Henrich, J., "Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Process and Large-scale Cooperation", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, pp.3~35 (2004)
  45. Henrich, J., "Why People Pusnish Defector: Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208, pp.79~89 (2001)
  46. Henrich, J., "In Search of Homo Economicus: Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies", American Economic Review, 91, pp.73~78 (2001)
  47. Henrich, J., "The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission", Evolution and Human Behavior, 22(3), pp.165~196 (2001)
  48. Henrich, J., "Costly Punishment across Human Societies", Science, 312, pp.1767~1770 (2006)
  49. Hoffman, E., "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol. 1" (2008), Elsevier
  50. Jassen, M., "Evolution of Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment When Retaliation is Possible", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 254(3), pp.541~545 (2008)
  51. Keats, B., "Genetic Structure of the Indigenous Populations in Australia and New Guinea", Journal of Human Evolution, 6, pp.319~339 (1977)
  52. Kummerli, R., "Resistance to Extreme Strategies rather than Prosocial Preference Can Explain Human Cooperation in Public Goods Game", Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 107, pp.10125~10130 (2010)
  53. Maynard Smith, J., "Group Selection and Kin Selection", Nature, 201(4924), pp.1145~1147 (1964)
  54. Miller, J., "Communication and Cooperation", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47(2), pp.179~195 (2002)
  55. Price, M. E., "The Resurrection of Group Selection as a Theory of Human Cooperation", Social Justice Research, 21, pp.228~240 (2008)
  56. Price, M. E., "Punitive Sentiment as an AntiFree Rider Psychological Device", Evolution and Human Behavior, 23, pp.203~231 (2002)
  57. Rabin, M., "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics", American Economic Review, 83(5), pp.1281~1302 (1993)
  58. Rand, D., "Anti-social Punishment Can Prevent the Co-evolution of Punishment and Cooperation", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 265, pp.624~632 (2010)
  59. Rand, D., "The Evolution of Antisocial Punishment in Optional Public Goods Games", Nature Communications, 2(434) (2011)
  60. Rilling, J. K., "A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation", Neuron, 35(2), pp.395~405 (2002)
  61. Smith, J. M., "Conformity as a Determinant of Behavior in a Resource Dilemma", Journal of Social Psychology, 134(2), pp.191~200 (1994)
  62. Smith, V., "Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms" (2008), Cambridge
  63. Symons, D., "The Evolution of Human Sexuality" (1979), Oxford University Press
  64. Tooby, J., "Cognitive Adaptations for nperson Exchange: The Evolutionary Roots of Organizational Behavior", Managerial and Decision Economics, 27(2-3), pp.103~129 (2006)
  65. Trivers, R. L., "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism", The Review of Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), pp.35~57 (1971)
  66. Wade, M. J., "A Critical Review of the Model of Group Selection", The Quarterly Review of Biology, 53(2), pp.101~114 (1978)
  67. Weiss, K. M., "Demographic Models for Anthropology" (1973), Society for American Archeology

관련 논문AI추천

협조적 행위를 둘러싼 경제적 논리와 구조적 논리최정규한국사회경제학회 · 사회경제평론2006 · 제27호반사회적 처벌, 그리고 정상적 처벌과 협조적 전략의 공진화안도경, 최정규한국사회경제학회 · 사회경제평론2013 · 제41호이타적 협조 전략의 진화 가능성을 둘러싼 제 가설 검토: 유유상종 원리를 중심으로 한 재해석최정규한국사회경제학회 · 사회경제평론2010 · 제35호사회적 선호와 제도: 문헌 연구최정규한국사회경제학회 · 사회경제평론2009 · 제32호이기주의, 이타주의, 자기집단중심주의: 진화론적 접근김정유한국사회경제학회 · 사회경제평론2013 · 제42호공공재 게임 실험에서 기여율의 하락: 학습 가설, 전략 가설, 상호적 맞대응 가설의 재평가최정규, 허준석한국계량경제학회 · 계량경제학보2012 · 제23권 제2호

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (6건)

화폐적 생산이론과 금융위기조복현pp. 47-91보증의 마술이 책임부재를 초래하는 논리적 역설 연구 - NINJA론의 존재가능성을 중심으로박지웅pp. 93-131피케티의 소득분배 가설에 대한 이론사적인 조망홍훈pp. 133-159피케티 이후의 마르크스비율류동민, 주상영pp. 161-183지니계수의 확장 및 이를 이용한 한국사회의 소득불평등 요인 분석정수빈, 김태환, 민은기pp. 185-230
원문 보기