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사회적 선호와 제도: 문헌 연구

Social Preferences and Institutions: A Literature Review

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한국사회경제학회 (Korean Association for Political Economy)|2009.05|사회경제평론 (The Review of Social & Economic Studies)|제32호|pp. 133-165

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참고문헌

키워드

사회적 선호불완전 계약행동/실험경제학Social PreferencesIncomplete contractBehavioral/Experimental Economics
주제분류경제학

초록

본 논문은 사회적 선호의 존재 및 그것이 갖는 함의를 제시한다. 우선 그 동안의 수많은 행동 실험에서 보고된 내용을 문헌연구함으로써 경제주체의 행동에는 이기적 동기로 환원될 수 없는 사회적 선호가 존재한다는 것을 확인한다. 그리고 사회적 선호가 경제 주체의 행동에서 언제/어디서 주요한 동기가 되는지, 또 다른 행위 동기인 이기적 선호와 상호작용하면서 실제 행위에 어떠한 방식으로 동기를 부여하게 되는지를 검토한다. 마지막으로 이러한 논의가 제도론에 어떤 함의를 갖는지를 논하면서, 제도 분석에 경제주체의 선호에 대한 분석이 반드시 포함되어야 하는 이유를 밝힌다.

Abstract

This paper surveys the studies on social preferences; the existence and its implications. From the extensive literature review, the paper introduces many experimental evidences that social preferences exist and cannot be reduced to selfish motives. It examines when and where social preferences become a main motive of behavior, and what the results are when they interact with other motives. Lastly, the paper discusses the implication of studies on social preferences, especially with regard to institutional analysis, and provides a reason why the analysis of preferences should be included in institutional analysis.

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