숫자양식과 빈도범위가 베이스 추론 과제에서 위험판단과 추론에 미치는 영향
Effects of Numerical Formats and Frequency ranges on Judgment of Risk and Inference in the Bayesian InferenceTask
0
조회
0
다운로드
4
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
위험정보를 확률이나 빈도양식으로 제시하고 질병으로 사망할 확률(기저율)에 대한 위험을 판단하게 하고 양성판정을 받은 사람이 질병에 걸렸을 확률(사후확률)에 대한 위험판단과 추론의 정확성을 비교하였다. 베이스 추론 과제를 사용한 연구 1에서 숫자양식의 효과가 관찰되었다. 참가자들은 위험이 확률보다는 빈도로 제시될 때 더 위험하다고 판단하였고 질병에 걸렸을 확률을 더 정확하게 추론하였다. 빈도의 범위가 좁을 때보다 넓을 때 더 위험하다고 판단하는 효과는 관찰되지 않았다. 분석적 사고체계가 위험판단에 미치는 영향을 검토하려고 사후확률을 계산하는 조건과 계산하지 않는 조건을 비교하였다. 숫자양식의 효과는 여전히 관찰되었다. 연구 2는 기저율과 사후확률의 크기에 따라 숫자양식 효과와 빈도범위 효과가 달라지는지 알아보았다. 숫자양식의 효과는 기저율과 사후확률의 크기에 상관없이 모든 조건에서 관찰되었다. 위험한 사건이 발생할 확률의 높고 낮음에 상관없이 빈도로 제시되었을 때 참가자들이 더 위험하다고 판단하였다. 그러나 빈도범위 효과는 기저율이 낮은 조건에서만 발견되었다. 본 연구의 결과들을 이중처리체계 이론과 관련시켜 논의하였다.
Abstract
We examined risk judgment and the accuracy of inference based on two kinds of probabilities in a Bayesian inference task: the death probability from a disease (base rates) and the probability of having a disease with positive results in the screening test (posterior probabilities). Risk information were presented in either a probability or a frequency format. In Study 1, we found a numerical format effect for both base rate and posterior probability. Participants rated information as riskier and inferred more accurately in the frequency condition than in the probability condition for both base rate and posterior probability. However, there was no frequency range effect, which suggested that the ranges of frequency format did not influence risk ratings. In order to find out how the analytic thought system influences risk ratings, we compared the ratings of a computation condition and those of a no-computation condition and still found the numerical format effect in computation condition. In Study 2, we examined the numerical format effect and frequency range effect in a high and a low probability condition and found the numerical format effect at each probability level. This result suggests that people feel riskier in the frequency format than in the probability format regardless of the base rates and the posterior probability. We also found a frequency range effect only for the low base rate condition. Our results were discussed in terms of the dual process theories.
참고문헌 (22)
- Chaiken, S, "Dual-process theories in social psychology" (1999), Guilford Press
- Chase, V. M, "Visions of rationality", Trends in Cognitive Scie, 2, pp.206~214 (1998)
- Denes-Raj, V, "Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: when people behave against their better judgment", Journal of personality and social psychology, 66, pp.819~829 (1994)
- Denes-Raj, V., "The generality of the ratio-bias phenomenon", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, pp.1083~1092 (1995)
- Eddy,D.M, "Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities, In Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases", pp.249~267 (1982), Cambridge University Press
- Epstein,S, "Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious", American Psychologist, 49, pp.709~724 (1994)
- Finucane, M. L, "Judgment and decision making: The dance of affect and reason. In Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research" (2003), Cambridge University Press.
- Gigerenzer,G, "The psychology of good judgment: frequency formats and simple algorithms", Journal of Medical decision making, 16, pp.273~280 (1996)
- Gigerenzer, G, "Simple tools for understanding risks: from innumeracy to insight", British Medical Journal, 327, pp.741~744 (2003)
- Gigerenzer, G, "How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: frequency formats", Psychological Review, 102, pp.684~704 (1995)
- Hoffrage, U., "Using natural frequencies to improve diagnostic inferences", Academic Medicine, 73, pp.538~540 (1998)
- Hsee, C, "Music, pandas, and muggers: On the affective psychology of value", Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1, pp.23~30 (2000)
- Kahneman, D., "Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In Heuristics of intuitive judgment: Extensions and Applications" (2002), Cambridge University Press.
- Kahneman, D, "Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness", Cognitive Psychology, 3, pp.430~454 (1972)
- Kirkpatrick, L., "Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: further evidence for two conceptual systems", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, pp.534~544 (1992)
- Krynski, T, "The role of causality in judgment under uncertainty", of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, pp.430~450 (2007)
- Pacini, R., "The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, pp.972~987 (1999)
- Sloman,S, "The empirical case for two systems of reasoning", Psychological Bulletin, 119, pp.3~22 (1996)
- Slovic, P., "Probability, danger and coercion: a study of risk perception and decision-making in mental health law", Law and Human Beh, 19, pp.49~65 (1995)
- Slovic, P., "Violence risk assessment and risk communication:the effects of using actual cases providing instruction,and employing probability versus frequency formats.Law and Human", Law and Human Behavior,, 24, pp.271~296 (2000)
- Yamagish,K, "When a 12.86% mortality is more dangerous than 24.14%: implications for risk communication", Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11, pp.495~506 (1997)
- Zhu, L., "Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation", Cognition, 98, pp.287~308 (2006)