논문KCI 등재
Correlation on belief and convergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games
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This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.
Abstract
This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.
참고문헌 (4)
- "A Theory of Learning Experimentation and Equi-librium in Games" (1988), Stanford University
- "Game Theory" (1995), MIT Press
- "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games", 9, pp.8~20 (1995)
- "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium", eco(metrica61), pp.1019~45 (1993)
관련 논문AI추천
Evolutionarily Stable Correlation김종민, Kam-Chau Wong한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2017 · 제33권 제1호Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizon and Imperfect Public MonitoringYves Guéron한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2019 · 제35권 제1호A Note on the Conventional Wisdom in Bargaining김종민경제연구소 · Journal of Economic Research (JER)2013 · 제18권 제2호LOGIT SOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN TWO-PERSON GAMES이강오한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2009 · 제25권 제2호Hierarchic Process and Relevance of Dominated Strategies in the Long Run김종민한국계량경제학회 · 계량경제학보2014 · 제25권 제4호Extensive Robustness of Large Games with a Continuum of Players김성현경제연구소 · Journal of Economic Research (JER)2010 · 제15권 제1호
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