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Correlation on belief and convergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games

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This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.

Abstract

This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.

참고문헌 (4)

  1. "A Theory of Learning Experimentation and Equi-librium in Games" (1988), Stanford University
  2. "Game Theory" (1995), MIT Press
  3. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games", 9, pp.8~20 (1995)
  4. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium", eco(metrica61), pp.1019~45 (1993)

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