A Note on the Conventional Wisdom in Bargaining
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We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of a pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.
Abstract
We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of a pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.
참고문헌 (15)
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