LOGIT SOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN TWO-PERSON GAMES
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper studies the properties of logit solution as a limit of logit equilibrium, where mistake probabilities depend in plausible ways on their expected costs. This dependence sometimes allows logit solution to select an equilibrium that differs from the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2 ×2 games. This paper also identifies a sufficient condition for logit solution to follow risk-dominance in 2 ×2 games.
Abstract
This paper studies the properties of logit solution as a limit of logit equilibrium, where mistake probabilities depend in plausible ways on their expected costs. This dependence sometimes allows logit solution to select an equilibrium that differs from the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2 ×2 games. This paper also identifies a sufficient condition for logit solution to follow risk-dominance in 2 ×2 games.
참고문헌 (8)
- Carlsson, Hans, "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection", Econometrica, 61, pp.989~1018 (1993)
- Chen, "Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach", Games and Economic Behavior, 18, pp.32~54 (1997)
- Harsanyi, John, "General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games" (1998), Cambridge: MIT Press
- Michihiro Kandori, "Learning,Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games", Econometica, 61, pp.29~56 (1993)
- Michihiro Kandori, "Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice", Games and Economic Behavior, 22, pp.30~60 (1998)
- McKelvey, Richard, "Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal-Form Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp.6~38 (1995)
- Morris, "-dominance and Belief Potential", Econometrica, 63, pp.145~157 (1995)
- Turocy,Theodore, "A Dynamic Homotopy Interpretation of the Logitstic Quantal Response Equilibrium Correspondence", Games and Economic Behavior, 51, pp.243~263 (2005)