Evolutionarily Stable Correlation
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Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.
Abstract
Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.
참고문헌 (12)
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