On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
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We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.
Abstract
We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.
참고문헌 (4)
- Amman, E., "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information : The two-payer case", Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1), pp.1~18 (1996)
- Moldovanu, B., "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests", American Economic Review, 91(3), pp.542~558 (2001)
- Moldovanu, B., "Contest architecture", Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), pp.70~96 (2006)
- Moldovanu, B., "Carrots and sticks : Prizes and punishments in contests", Economic Inquiry, 50(2), pp.453~462 (2012)