Efficiency and Revenue in Asymmetric Auctions
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We study the efficiency and revenue properties of first- and second-price auctions in an environment where bidders’ values are drawn from different binary distributions. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a first-price auction to induce an efficient allocation. The condition reveals the source of allocative inefficiencies in asymmetric firstprice auctions. We further show that the seller’s revenue is higher in a second-price auction than it is in a first-price auction whenever allocations in the two auction formats are efficient. We highlight how the difference in different bidder types’ beliefs induces the results.
Abstract
We study the efficiency and revenue properties of first- and second-price auctions in an environment where bidders’ values are drawn from different binary distributions. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a first-price auction to induce an efficient allocation. The condition reveals the source of allocative inefficiencies in asymmetric firstprice auctions. We further show that the seller’s revenue is higher in a second-price auction than it is in a first-price auction whenever allocations in the two auction formats are efficient. We highlight how the difference in different bidder types’ beliefs induces the results.
참고문헌 (13)
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