On asymmetry in all-pay auctions
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This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players’ valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes affect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players’ valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players’ valuations tends to decrease total expenditures under both complete and incomplete information.
Abstract
This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players’ valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes affect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players’ valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players’ valuations tends to decrease total expenditures under both complete and incomplete information.
참고문헌 (12)
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