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Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types : Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auction

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This paper establishes the equilibrium existence in the first-price auction in the setup where bidders are partitioned into “knowledge groups” so that each bidder observes the types of rival bidders in the same group but not the others’ types.

Abstract

This paper establishes the equilibrium existence in the first-price auction in the setup where bidders are partitioned into “knowledge groups” so that each bidder observes the types of rival bidders in the same group but not the others’ types.

참고문헌 (9)

  1. Ash, R. B., "Real Analysis and Probability" (1972), Academic Press
  2. Fudenberg, G., "Game Theory" (1991), MIT Press
  3. Kim, J., "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions", Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), pp.383~397 (2004)
  4. Lebrun, B, "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case", International Economic Review, 40(1), pp.125~142 (1999)
  5. Maskin, E., "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions", Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), pp.413~438 (2000)
  6. Milgrom, P., "Monotone Comparative Statics", Econometrica, 62(1), pp.157~180 (1994)
  7. Myerson, R. B, "Optimal Auction Design", Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), pp.58~73 (1981)
  8. Reny, P. J, "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games", Econometrica, 67(5), pp.1029~1056 (1999)
  9. Riley, J. G., "Optimal Auctions", American Economic Review, 71(3), pp.381~392 (1981)

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