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Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder

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초록

We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium.

Abstract

We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium.

참고문헌 (14)

  1. Bikhchandani, S., "Equilibria in Open Common Value Auctions", Journal of Economic Theory, 53(1), pp.101~130 (1991)
  2. Campbell, C., "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?", Journal of Economic Theory, 91(1), pp.106~120 (2000)
  3. Change, S.-J., "Monetary Allocation Mechanism under Asymmetric Information and Limited Communication", Seoul Journal of Economics, 3(1), pp.33~71 (1990)
  4. Choi, S., "Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment", Mimeograph, ~ (2015)
  5. Chung, K. -S., "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations", Mimeograph, ~ (2000)
  6. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., "The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1), pp.105~114 (1982)
  7. Hendricks, K., "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price", Econometrica, 62(6), pp.1414~1444 (1994)
  8. Kim, J., "The Value of an Informed Bidder in Common Value Auctions", Journal of Economic Theory, 143(1), pp.585~595 (2008)
  9. Kim, J., "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions", Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), pp.383~397 (2004)
  10. Lebrun, B., "First Price Auction in Asymmetric N Bidder Case", International Economic Review, 40(1), pp.125~142 (1999)
  11. Maskin, E., "Privatization", pp.115~136 (1992), Institute fur Weltwirschaften der Universät Kiel
  12. Maskin, E., "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions", Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), pp.439~454 (2000)
  13. Maskin, E., "Asymmetric Auctions", Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), pp.413~438 (2000)
  14. Milgrom, P., "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding", Econometrica, 50, pp.1089~1122 (1982)

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