정묘호란의 동인 재고

Abstract

With emphasis on the differences between Nurhaci and Hong Taiji in dealing with Chosǒn Korea, this article reexamines the motives of the Manchu invasion of Korea in early 1627. It verifies that Chosǒn’s pro-Ming policy employed right after the Palace Coup of 1623 had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Manchu invasion. It also examines the contents of the Peace Pact of 1627 concluded between Later Jin and Chosǒn to better understand the causes, objects, and motives of the sudden invasion, with the result that there was no causal relationship between Later Jin’s economic distress and the invasion. The largest problems on the negotiation table were mainly political and military affairs. Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to regard them as the key motives of the invasion because political and military situations both Chosǒn and Later Jin encountered had been chronic for about ten years since Nurhaci first launched a military campaign against Ming China in 1618. So then, why did the war broke out suddenly only three months after the death of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji’s accession to the throne? This article pays attention to the fact that the two Manchu leaders were very different from each other in dealing with Chosǒn Korea located at the rear of Later Jin. Hong Taiji contended that Later Jin should attack and pacify Chosǒn first so that it could concentrate its military strength on the western front against Ming China. Nurhaci, however, was lukewarm about invading Chosǒn in that it would not be a good strategy to have two enemies in the front and the rear at the same time. It was the very reason why he preferred talks to war with regard to Chosǒn affairs. This article thus draws a conclusion that the direct motive of the Manchu invasion was the replacement of Khan from moderate Nurhaci to hackish Hong Taiji.