냉전시기의 북미협상 - 1968년 푸에블로호 사건을 중심으로
The Negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea in the Cold War Era - At the 1968 Pueblo Incident
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
1968년 푸에블로호 나포 이후 판문점에서 이루어진 북미 협상은 냉전시기의 남북미 삼각관계의 악순환을 보여준다. 존슨 행정부는 군사적 대응과 외교적 대응 방안을 검토했으나, 승무원의 석방을 위해 북한과의 직접협상에 나섰다. 북한은 판문점 회담에서 미국으로부터의 체제인정, 한미균열, 그리고 국내선전 효과를 중시했다. 판문점 회담의 1단계인 1차 회담(2.2)부터 7차 회담(2.16)까지 양측은 푸에블로호의 영해침범 여부를 둘러싸고 대립했다. 2단계인 8차 회담(2.20)부터 15차 회담(4.22)까지는 사과의 수준과 조건을 둘러싼 공방이 벌어졌다. 3단계는 16차(5.8)부터 마지막 회담인 29차 회담까지로 미국 측의 ‘부인을 전제로 한 사과’라는 방식로 마무리 되었다. 최종 방안인 ‘부인을 전제로 한 사과’가 교착을 타개하고 협상을 마무리한 것은 분명하지만, 그것이 협상 성공의 결정적 변수라고 보기 어렵다. 북한은 정치적인 선전 효과를 충분히 달성했다고 판단한 시점에서 승무원을 석방했다.
Abstract
The negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea after pueblo incident symbolized the vicious circle of the triangle relationships among U.S, South Korea and North Korea, during the cold war era. Johnson administration had to accept the direct negotiation with North Korea, although they initially had considered military actions. North Korea had intended to get the regime recognition, split the relationships between the U.S. and South Korea, and take the propaganda effect. During the first phase (1~7th meeting), the U.S and North Korea had a conflict on whether the Pueblo had violated the territorial waters of North Korea. During the second phase (8~15th meeting), the level and condition of the apology was confronted issue of the negotiation. During the third phase (16~29th meeting), the negotiations ended after North Korea accepted the final suggestion of the U.S, ‘the repudiated apology’ - simply signing the confession while publically repudiating it beforehand. Although ‘the repudiated apology’ was the skill to end the negotiation, it was hardly the decisive key of the successful negotiation, rather North Korea released crews of Pueblo after they had judged to take the political propaganda effect.
참고문헌 (14)
- "로동신문 1968. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.10, 2.17", ~ (1968)
- 김정배, "북한, 미국, 그리고 냉전체제: 1968년 Pueblo호 사건을 중심으로", 미국사연구, 27, pp.115~144 (2008), 한국미국사학회
- 이문항, "JSA-판문점(1953~1994)" (2001), 소화
- 홍석률, "1968년 푸에블로호 사건과 남한·북한·미국의 삼각관계", 한국사연구, (113) (2001), 한국사연구회
- "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964~1968 Vol. XXIX. Part 1" (2000), United States Government Printing Office
- "History and Public Program Digital Archive"[URL]
- North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow, 1962~1972, "Bernd Schaefer", Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, ~ (2004)
- Cécil Menétrey-Monchau, "The Mayaguez Incident as an Epilogue to the Vietnam War and It’s Reflection of the Post-Vietnam Political Equilibrium in Southeast Asia", Cold War History, 5(3) (2005)
- Jack Cheevers, "Act of War; Lyndon Johnson, North Korea and The Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo" (2013), NAL Caliber
- David J. Brulé, "Explaining and Forecasting Leader’s Decisions: A Poliheuristic Analysis of the Iron Hostage Rescue Decision", International Studies Perspective, 6(1) (2005)
- David Patrick Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situation", British Journal of Political Science, 26(4) (1996)
- David Patrick Houghton, "Spies and Boats and Planes; An Examination of U.S. Decision-Making during the Pueblo Hostage Crisis of 1968", Journal of Cold War Studies, 17(4) (1968)
- Mitchell Lerner, "A Failure of Perception: Lynden Johnson, North Korean Ideology, and the Pueblo Incident", Diplomatic History, 25(4) (2001)
- Robert R. Simmons, "The Pueblo, EC-121 and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuties and Changes", Occasional Papers, 1978, pp.20(8), ~