The Consequence of Welfare Spending and Government Ideology on Corruption Voting
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This study examines whether the increase in welfare spending before an election dampens the negative effect of perceived public corruption on the government party’s vote share. By analyzing 182 legislative elections in 35 OECD countries from 1995 to 2016, this research finds that the vote share of the government party decreases as the perceived level of public corruption increases whereas the negative effect of corruption on incumbent vote is mitigated when the welfare spending increases before elections. Yet, the conditional effect of government welfare spending on corruption voting becomes weaker when the ideology of governing party is right. This result provides one of the explanations of why political leaders who are charged with criminal wrongdoing are continuously re-elected rather than repudiated by voters in severe political corruption. Also, this finding implies that political leaders, especially left party leaders, who are accused of corruption are more likely to pursue the expansionary fiscal policy or the generous welfare policy before elections because the executive or the government party may avoid the blame for their tarnished actions by expanding welfare spending before elections.
Abstract
This study examines whether the increase in welfare spending before an election dampens the negative effect of perceived public corruption on the government party’s vote share. By analyzing 182 legislative elections in 35 OECD countries from 1995 to 2016, this research finds that the vote share of the government party decreases as the perceived level of public corruption increases whereas the negative effect of corruption on incumbent vote is mitigated when the welfare spending increases before elections. Yet, the conditional effect of government welfare spending on corruption voting becomes weaker when the ideology of governing party is right. This result provides one of the explanations of why political leaders who are charged with criminal wrongdoing are continuously re-elected rather than repudiated by voters in severe political corruption. Also, this finding implies that political leaders, especially left party leaders, who are accused of corruption are more likely to pursue the expansionary fiscal policy or the generous welfare policy before elections because the executive or the government party may avoid the blame for their tarnished actions by expanding welfare spending before elections.