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논문

통화량 조절수단의 관료유인과 인플레이션 효과

Bureaucratic Choice of Monetary Instruments and Its Consequences

김일중|김인배
한국경제학회 (The Korean Economic Association)|2009.09|경제학연구 (The Korean Journal of Economic Studies)|제57권 제3호|pp. 5-29

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참고문헌

키워드

재량권인플레이션inflation중앙은행central bank재할인관료유인discount windowbureaucratic incentive
주제분류경제학

초록

본 논문은 중앙은행의 통화량 조절수단으로서 재할인의존도가 초래하는 인플레 이션 편의를 추정하였다. Kim and Kim(2007)은 흔히 통화량 조절수단으로서 무 차별적으로 취급되는 공개시장조작과 재할인정책이 관료적 입장에서 보면 큰 차 이가 있을 수 있다는 점에 착안하여, 각국의 재할인의존도가 그 나라 중앙은행의 재량권과 관련이 있음을 보인 바 있다. 본 논문은 이를 연장하여 재할인의존도가 높을수록 그 재량적 속성으로 인해 통화량의 변동성이 커지고, 이때 가격의 하방 경직성이 작용하여 인플레이션 편의가 발생함을 국제자료를 통해 검증하였다. 이 러한 연구는 중앙은행이 외부적 압력으로부터의 독립과 마찬가지로 내부의 관료 적 유인으로부터의 독립 역시 함께 고려되어야 한다는 점에서 중앙은행 독립성에 대해 시사하는 점이 있으리라 사료된다.

Abstract

This paper estimated the inflation bias of the discount windows as a monetary instrument. Kim and Kim(2007) showed that there is a significant difference between the open market operations and discount windows, which are often treated as ‘indifferent’ in the economics textbooks, from the bureaucratic perspective of the central bank, and proved that central bank’s dependence on the discount windows is related to its discretionary power over the monetary policy. This paper extends Kim and Kim (2007) and shows that higher dependence causes larger monetary fluctuation, which under the downward rigidity of the price level results in inflation bias. This finding will provide a beneficial implication for establishing the meaningful independence of the central bank.

참고문헌 (40)

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