연방경제의 재정정책, 경제성장과 소득분배
Fiscal Policies, Economic Growth, and Income Distribution in Federalism
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본 연구는 중앙정부가 지방정부의 공공서비스에 대한 재정적 지원으로 고(高)자 본 지방정부로부터 저(低)자본 지방정부로 자원을 재분배할 경우에 장기적 경제 성장에 미치는 효과를 동태적 일반균형 모형을 사용하여 분석한다. 각 지방정부 는 조세정책을 독립적으로 선택하거나, 또는 다른 지방정부와 상호 협조하여 선 택할 수 있다. 본 연구는 각각의 경우에 대하여, 연방 재분배정책이 장기 경제성 장과 동태적 안정성에 미치는 영향을 분석하고 비교한다. 특히, 비협조적 연방경 제 하에서 중앙정부의 이전지출(income transfer)정책과 지방정부의 재정정책에 서 기대하는 정책효과가 완전하게 내부화(perfectly internalized)되지 못함으로써 효율성 비용(efficiency cost)이 발생하고, 중앙정부의 재분배정책과 지방정부의 재정정책간의 전략적 조합(strategically complementary)은 장기 균형의 불확정 성(indeterminacy)을 야기시킨다. 효율성 비용은 과소한 세율과 과속의 경제성장 을 가져오고, 균형의 불확정성은 소득불균등의 원인이 된다.
Abstract
We present a general equilibrium dynamic model in which a federal authority redistributes resources from capital-rich to capital-poor countries to finance public services and help poorer countries to grow. We study the effects of commonly used federal redistributive policies on long-term growth and dynamic stability, when national fiscal authorities either choose their tax policies independently of each other or choose them jointly. We compare the properties of Nash and cooperative equilibria, and show the efficiency costs and indeterminacy associated with a combination of non-coordination and federal transfers. The efficiency costs lead to inefficiently rapid economic growth and indeterminacy explains income inequality in the long run.
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