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미국에서 정당방위 수단으로서 치명적 위력의 행사와 수정헌법 제2조 권리에 대한 연구—한국의 정당방위법과의 비교법적 분석—

Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense under the Context of the United States Second Amendment Rights—Comparative Perspectives on the Korean Self-Defense Law—

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The self-defense law in the United States requires a defendant to prove that it was necessary for him to use force in response in order to protect himself from attack. The defendant may use whatever degree of force is necessary—including deadly force (i.e., force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury)—to defend himself if he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm—reasonable belief of threat. In addition, the use of force used by the defendant must be proportional to the attack in kind and degree, not exceeding the force used against him. Under the duty to retreat, the defendant is not permitted to use deadly force if he can avoid the necessity of using deadly force by retreating and can retreat with complete safety to himself. As an exception to the duty to retreat, there is the castle doctrine that there is no duty to retreat from his home if he is attacked while being inside his own home or if it is necessary to prevent forcible felony inside the home. In addition, currently the majority of the states—28 states—have enacted laws eschewing the duty to retreat requirement in public places, called the “stand-your-ground” laws. If a defendant has a right to be where he is, there is no duty to retreat under this law. As a handgun is one of the most often-used means for self-defense in the U.S., there are two key issues as to the extent of individual rights for handgun use in self-defense under the Second Amendment. First, the Supreme Court in D.C. v. Heller held that individuals have a right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense. The availability of castle doctrine would make it easier for defendants to justify the use of handguns after the Heller decision. Recently, the Supreme Court in N.Y.S.R.P.A. v. Bruen held that individuals’ rights to carry guns in public for self-defense purpose should not be restricted by state governments by striking down New York law that had a strict requirement in issuing a license to carry guns in public. Because of Bruen, people residing in one of the stand-your-ground states would be able to carry and use handguns for the purpose of self-defense without a duty to retreat. The main difference on self-defense laws between the U.S. and Korea is that Korea does not have any laws equivalent to the castle doctrine or stand-your-ground law which grant individuals with a lot of privilege and power for self-defense. Also, the requirement of “reasonable or sufficient cause” for the defendant to exercise self-defense in Korea is more narrowly construed than the requirement of “reasonable belief of threat” in the U.S. Despite the fact that the rates of violent crimes in Korea have gone up, thereby necessitating the need for self-defense, the Korean Supreme Court has failed to adequately provide clear standards in determining the legitimacy of “reasonable or sufficient cause” and also failed to evaluate the factual situations of each case in detail while placing more emphasis on the proportionality principle which consequently led to the outcome that only a limited number of self-defense claims have been accepted.

Abstract

The self-defense law in the United States requires a defendant to prove that it was necessary for him to use force in response in order to protect himself from attack. The defendant may use whatever degree of force is necessary—including deadly force (i.e., force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury)—to defend himself if he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm—reasonable belief of threat. In addition, the use of force used by the defendant must be proportional to the attack in kind and degree, not exceeding the force used against him. Under the duty to retreat, the defendant is not permitted to use deadly force if he can avoid the necessity of using deadly force by retreating and can retreat with complete safety to himself. As an exception to the duty to retreat, there is the castle doctrine that there is no duty to retreat from his home if he is attacked while being inside his own home or if it is necessary to prevent forcible felony inside the home. In addition, currently the majority of the states—28 states—have enacted laws eschewing the duty to retreat requirement in public places, called the “stand-your-ground” laws. If a defendant has a right to be where he is, there is no duty to retreat under this law. As a handgun is one of the most often-used means for self-defense in the U.S., there are two key issues as to the extent of individual rights for handgun use in self-defense under the Second Amendment. First, the Supreme Court in D.C. v. Heller held that individuals have a right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense. The availability of castle doctrine would make it easier for defendants to justify the use of handguns after the Heller decision. Recently, the Supreme Court in N.Y.S.R.P.A. v. Bruen held that individuals’ rights to carry guns in public for self-defense purpose should not be restricted by state governments by striking down New York law that had a strict requirement in issuing a license to carry guns in public. Because of Bruen, people residing in one of the stand-your-ground states would be able to carry and use handguns for the purpose of self-defense without a duty to retreat. The main difference on self-defense laws between the U.S. and Korea is that Korea does not have any laws equivalent to the castle doctrine or stand-your-ground law which grant individuals with a lot of privilege and power for self-defense. Also, the requirement of “reasonable or sufficient cause” for the defendant to exercise self-defense in Korea is more narrowly construed than the requirement of “reasonable belief of threat” in the U.S. Despite the fact that the rates of violent crimes in Korea have gone up, thereby necessitating the need for self-defense, the Korean Supreme Court has failed to adequately provide clear standards in determining the legitimacy of “reasonable or sufficient cause” and also failed to evaluate the factual situations of each case in detail while placing more emphasis on the proportionality principle which consequently led to the outcome that only a limited number of self-defense claims have been accepted.

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