통일이후 한국의 통상전략 연구 : 실험·행동경제학적 연구
A study on Korea’s trade strategies after the unification : An experimental and behavioral economic approach
0
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 논문은 통일과 같은 통상환경의 변화에 따른 통상전략의 변화에 대해 실험행동경제학적 연구방법을 활용하여 살펴본다. 본 연구에서는 통상협상을 가정한 양자간협상게임에 대한 실험을 활용하여 통상환경의 변화에 따라 협상참가자들의 편익이 이론적 예측에 질적으로 부합한다는 점을 확인하였다. 또한 실증분석에서 협상참가자들이 역동적인 통상환경의 변화에 대해 적응해 가는 것을 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 점에서 통일 이후 통상환경의 변화자체가 불확실성을 높인다고 하더라도 협상당사국이 충분히 적응할 수 있음을 짐작할 수 있고, 통상환경의 변화에서도 협상참여자간 편익의 공평한 배분이 비교적 강하게 고려되는 점을 확인할 수 있다.
Abstract
This paper examines the changes in the trade strategy in response to changes in the trade environment, such as unification, using experimental and behavioral economic approaches. In this study, the benefits of the negotiation participants are qualitatively matched to the theoretical predictions according to the changes of the trade environment, using the experiment on the bilateral negotiation game. In addition, in the empirical analysis, it was confirmed that the negotiation participants were adapting to the change of the dynamic trade environment. In this respect, it can be assumed that the negotiating parties can fully adapt even if the change of the trade environment after the unification raises the uncertainty, and the equitable distribution of the benefits between the negotiating participants is strongly considered in the change of the trade environment.
참고문헌 (23)
- 강문성, "남북한 경제통합의 혜택과 한반도 통일국가의 역할" (2014), 고려대학교 아세아문제연구소, 아연출판부
- 남북경제공동체추진구상 용역보고서, "대외경제정책연구원", ~ (2011)
- 남북한 경제통합의 효과, "성한경", 대외경제정책연구원, ~ (2014)
- 통일연구원, "한반도 통일의 미래와 주변 4국의 기대" (2013)
- 현대경제연구원, "통일편익 비용보다 크다" (2010)
- 현대경제연구원, "통일한국의 경제적 잠재력 추정" (2014)
- Baron, D., "Bargaining in Legislatures", American Political Science Review, 83(2), pp.1181~1206 (1989)
- An Experimental Test of Rubinstein’s bargaining model, "Binmore, K.", ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, ~, pp.ELSE Working Paper #260 (2007)
- Fréchette, G., "Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology", pp.360~390 (2015), Oxford University Press
- Fréchette, G., "The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol 2.", pp.435~480 (2016), Princeton University Press
- Fréchette, G., "Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules", American Political Science Review, 88(4), pp.848~881 (2003)
- Fréchette, G., "Gamson’s Law versus Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory", Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2), pp.365~390 (2005)
- Fréchette, G., "Nominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining", Journal of Public Economics, 89(8), pp.1497~1517 (2005)
- Fréchette G., "Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers", Econometrica, 76(6), pp.1893~1938 (2005)
- Gamson, W., "A Theory of Coalition Formation", American Sociological Review, 26(3), pp.373~382 (1962)
- Kagel, J., "Veto power in committees: An Experimental Study", Experimental Economics, 13(2), pp.167~188 (2010)
- Morelli, M., "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining", American Political Science Review, 93(4), pp.809~820 (1999)
- Rubinstein, A., "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", Econometrica, 50, pp.97~109 (1982)
- Sung, H., "Delays in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: An Experimental Study", Asian Economic Papers, 11(1), pp.160~176 (2012)
- 성한경, "Learning in the WTO", DDA Negotiations?: An Experimental Study, 2015, pp.19(3), 243~273[DOI]
- 성한경, "An Experimental Economic Study on the US-EU FTA: A Perspective on Within-Industry Negotiations", 국제통상연구, 20(3), pp.109~127 (2015), 한국국제통상학회
- Sung, H., "An experimental study on internal and external negotiation for trade agreements", ~ (2016)
- Winter, E., "Voting and Vetoing", American Political Science Review, 90(4), pp.813~823 (1996)