재무분석가의 명성과 이익예측 허딩 간의 관계
The Relations Between Financial Analyst Reputation and Earning Forecast Herding
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본 연구는 2002년부터 2005년까지 4년 동안 국내 재무분석가의 순위자료와 이익예측자료를 이용하여, 재무분석가의 명성과 이익예측 허딩 간의 관계에 대하여 살펴보았다. 첫째, 명성이 높은 재무분석가들은 명성이 낮은 재무분석가들보다 유의적으로 낮은 허딩더미를 보고하였으며, 명성이 높은 재무분석가일수록 허딩확률이 낮았다. 이는 명성이 높은 재무분석가가 명성이 낮은 재무분석가 보다 낮은 수준의 허딩행태를 보이고 있음을 의미한다. 둘째, 명성이 낮은 재무분석가는 명성이 낮은 재무분석가들의 컨센서스 보다 명성이 높은 재무분석가들의 컨센서스에 보다 더 허딩하고 있음을 발견하였다. 이는 명성이 높은 재무분석가의 이익예측치는 재무분석가 시장에서 선도적인 예측치로서의 역할을 수행하고 있음을 의미한다. 종합적인 분석결과 재무분석가의 명성은 재무분석가의 허딩행태에 영향을 미치는 주요 요인임을 발견하였다.
Abstract
Using a Korean financial analyst ranking and earnings forecast data, this study examines the relations between the financial analyst reputation and earnings forecast herding during a four year period from 2002 to 2005. First, we find that highly reputed financial analysts show significantly lower herding dummy than other reputed ones. And highly reputed financial analysts tend to have a lower likelihood of earnings forecast herding. It indicates that financial analysts with higher reputation show lower herding behavior than other analysts. Second, lower reputed financial analysts herd more on the consensus of higher reputed financial analysts than that of lower reputed analysts. It means that earnings forecast of financial analysts with higher reputation plays a pivotal role as leading forecast in Korean financial analyst market. Taken as a whole, we provide interesting evidence that the reputation of financial analysts is a major determinant of financial analysts' herding behavior.
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