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이사회 및 감사위원회의 특성과 회계부정 간의 관계에 관한 실증분석

An Empirical Analysis on the Relation between the Board of Director and Audit Committee's Characteristics and Financial Statement Fraud

조현우|박종일|최관
한국공인회계사회 (THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS)|2008.12|회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구 (Study on Accounting, Taxation & Auditing)|제48호|pp. 351-389|DOI 10.22781/kicpa.2008..48.351

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참고문헌

키워드

기업지배구조corporate governance감사위원회 특성회계부정기업이사회 특성board characteristicsaudit committee characteristicsfraudulent financial reporting
주제분류회계학

초록

본 논문은 이사회와 감사위원회의 특성을 이용하여 회계부정기업의 기업지배구조 특성을 연구하였다. 회계부정기업은 금융감독원의 감사보고서 감리에 지적받은 기업들이다. 우리나라는 외환위기 이후에 이사회와 감사위원회에 초점을 두고 기업지배구조를 개선시켜 왔다. 선진국에 비하면 이 제도들의 도입기간이 짧고 처음 실행되어서 여러 문제점이 있었으나 시간이 흘러감에 따라서 법규들이 정비되고 기업에서도 이들 제도가 정착되어가고 있다. 이러한 시점에서 회계부정의 발생가능성과 관련하여 이들 제도의 효과성을 알아보는 것은 학술적으로나 정책적으로 유익한 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다. 실증분석결과에 따르면 첫째, 이사회 특성에 대한 결과는 이사회에서 차지하는 사외이사비율이 높을수록, 이사회에서 사외이사의 참석률이 높을수록, 적어도 1인 이상 교수가 사외이사로 선임된 경우 회계부정기업일 가능성이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 즉 국내 선행연구(김정애 2007)에서 보고된 결과와 달리 회계부정기업은 이사회의 독립성이 낮으며, 활동적이지 못하고, 전문성이 낮다는 결과이다. 둘째, 감사위원회 특성에 대한 결과는 회색이사가 감사위원회 내 사외이사로 선임되면 회계부정기업일 가능성이 높고, 적어도 1인 이상 교수가 감사위원회 내 사외이사로 선임되면 회계부정기업일 가능성이 낮게 나타났다. 이는 감사위원회의 활동성 보다는 독립성, 전문성이 높을수록 회계부정의 발생가능성이 낮음을 의미한다. 이상의 감리지적기업을 통해 살펴본 연구결과에서는 국내의 경우도 이 분야의 외국의 선행연구(Beasley 1996; Beasley et al. 1999; 2000 등)와 같이 기업지배구조의 특성이 회계부정 발생가능성에 영향을 줄 수 있고, 우수한 기업지배구조를 가진 기업일수록 회계부정의 발생가능성이 낮다는 것을 실증적으로 보여준다.

Abstract

Since the foreign currency crisis in 1997, IBRD has required the Korean government to take measures such as reformulation of the Korean corporations' governance structure as a means to improve reliability of accounting information and transparency of their management. During the Asian financial crisis, many Korean firms were blamed for their opaque management and family-owned ownership structure. Along with the pressures from overseas, the Korean government supported by civil activist groups has exerted voluntary efforts to improve governance structure of the Korean corporations. These efforts led to the regulation in 1999 that all companies listed in the Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) are obliged to nominate outside directors in their board of directors. Also, to alleviate the severe problem in corporate governance for large Korean conglomerates(so-called Chabol), the Korean government, from 2000, mandated the establishment of audit committees for large companies listed in the stock market. In addition, it became mandatory by the Security Exchange Act in 2000 that the Korean companies, either listed in the KSE or Kosdaq, with total assets in excess of ￦2 trillion launch the audit committees comprising at least 3 directors, and at least 2/3 of the committee members should be elected from outside directors. Concerns about earnings manipulation and recent high-profile accounting scandals have led most of the investing community to call for more effective board and audit committees as a means to improve the quality of financial statements. In response to these calls, the government has adopted regulations on the function of board and audit committees in a number of areas including the independence of their members, their accounting or financial expertise, and their activities. Thus, The role of the board and audit committee in corporate governance is a subject of increasing regulatory interest. This study addresses the impact of certain board and audit committee characteristics on the likelihood of financial statement fraud. We examined how various characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee' governance features affect the occurrence of corporate fraud. This study focuses on board and audit committee characteristics. Such staffing decisions can directly affect the ability of the board and audit committee to monitor management's financial reporting process. We hypothesize that financial statement fraud will be negatively associated with board and audit committee independence, expertise, and activity. This study has implications for numerous parties, such as auditors, investors, regulators, boards of directors, audit committee members, and other corporate governance reform proponents who frequently examine board and audit committee characteristics to assess its effectiveness in monitoring the firm's financial reporting processes. We examine 60 firms which issued fraudulent reports in the period 2000-2005, together with matched pairs control groups of similar year and size. The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, for the board characteristics, we find that when board independence(defined as the percentage of outside directors), board activity(outsider board participation), and board expertise(defined as a board containing at least one outside director with professor) increase, the likelihood of fraudulent financial statement decrease. This suggests that the independent, expertise, and activity directors on the board play a monitoring and controlling function in the context of fraud. Second, for the audit committee characteristics, we find that when audit committee's non-independence(defined as an audit committee containing at least one outside director with grey) increases, the likelihood of a fraudulent financial statement increases and also when audit committee expertise(defined as a board containing at least one outside director with professor) increases, the likelihood of a fraudulent financial statement decreases. Our findings suggest that the composition and structure of a board and audit committee are significantly correlated with the incidence of financial statement fraud. This study makes several contributions to the accounting literature. Its adds to our knowledge of the link between the credibility of the financial reporting system and quality of governance mechanisms by extending research on the causes and consequences of financial statement fraud. This study also provides additional insight into the interaction between the board, the audit committee, and management in the financial reporting process. And the findings of this study also suggest several valuable insights into the composition and regulation of the board and audit committee for the Korean regulators.

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