기업결합통제에 있어서 진입분석

Abstract

An entry analysis typically inquires if the entry is likely to take place, and, in case it does, the analysis further examines if the entry can occur in due course and substantially so as to correct anti-competitive problems that may emerge in merge cases. A new entry will often induce prices more competitive for better consumer interests, and an entry analysis plays an important role in assessing competition effects of merger. In a market offering easy entry conditions the incumbents will not exercise market power unless a new entry is introduced. Possibilities of effects unilateral or cooperative due to a merger can be constrained by a mere threat alone, of the potential entry,in a market with no or low entry barriers, and those effects can be corrected when the entry actually takes place. The Guidelines of the Korea Fair Trade Commission indicate that, in case an entry into a market can be easily achieved in a short time, the number of rivals that decreased immediately after a merger will increase again, which will limits competition less substantially; this implies a new entry can contribute to sustaining the ongoing competition in a market with no or low barriers, even by a single effect of increasing number of firms caused by the entry. Then a new entry can influence on the effective competition maintained in a market where a merger is being tried or already achieved. An entry analysis assesses market entry conditions to determine whether entry barriers exist and how high the barriers are if they exist, constituting an integral part in a merger survey. Korean industries are of notably conglomerate-focused structure, so that in such a market non-conglomerate outsiders could find it difficult to overcome the systematic entry barriers which render the newcomers less competitive in cash flow, technology, manpower, logistics, advertisements, information,relationship to Government, group supports, and scales and scopes of economy, whereas conglomerates enjoy entering a market with a relative ease, increasing their subsidiaries ever. According to a report by the Korea Fair Trade Commission on April 10, 2010, the number of conglomerate subsidiaries subject to limit to mutual investments, whose total assets exceeds 5 billion US$, has been increasing remarkably since the new Administration began. Under this circumstance, an entry analysis is an effective process to identify a merger lawsuit that could undermine fair competition. A rule of thumb could give a visible contrast between the United States and Korea concerning a merger, granting simple comparison may not be accurate because of the huge difference in economy scales of the two countries; but as long as an entry analysis is concerned in merger matters,the US authority governing market competition is strict enough to allow mainly, on consent decision, divesture of assets and brands, while in Korea the majority of merger cases of conglomerate subsidiaries are likely to result in approval by the reason of the exception of failing company, regardless of entry analyses that report whether relevant entry barriers exist or not, and how high or low the barriers are.