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기업결합의 경쟁자 배제효과와 그 위법성 요건 - 기업결합 심사기준을 중심으로 -

Illegality of foreclose competitors on the Merger Regulation

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In Competition law, foreclosure means preventing a competitors or potential competitor from competing by denying it access to inputs or customers. And it is an important consideration for competition analysis in several context, for example, monopolization(abuse of dominance), vertical restraints, and non-horizontal mergers. The legal test for mergers is substantial lessening of competition. With respect to vertical mergers, a key issue is whether the combination of a supplier and a customer foreclose competitors in each relevant market. As to conglomerate mergers, the essential question is whether the merged entity acquires ability to foreclose or exclude competitors after the merger in a relevant market. Note that under merger guidelines, the main concern in the context of conglomerate merger is that of foreclosure, so in assessing the likelihood of foreclosure, competition authority examines market share, concentration levels, entry barriers and any relationship of products. When merger concerned may lead to reduction in actual or potential competitors' ability or incentive to compete, it raise competition concerns.

Abstract

In Competition law, foreclosure means preventing a competitors or potential competitor from competing by denying it access to inputs or customers. And it is an important consideration for competition analysis in several context, for example, monopolization(abuse of dominance), vertical restraints, and non-horizontal mergers. The legal test for mergers is substantial lessening of competition. With respect to vertical mergers, a key issue is whether the combination of a supplier and a customer foreclose competitors in each relevant market. As to conglomerate mergers, the essential question is whether the merged entity acquires ability to foreclose or exclude competitors after the merger in a relevant market. Note that under merger guidelines, the main concern in the context of conglomerate merger is that of foreclosure, so in assessing the likelihood of foreclosure, competition authority examines market share, concentration levels, entry barriers and any relationship of products. When merger concerned may lead to reduction in actual or potential competitors' ability or incentive to compete, it raise competition concerns.

참고문헌 (13)

  1. 곽상현, "수직결합과 경쟁제한성 판단 - 봉쇄효과를 중심으로 -", 저스티스, (102), pp.65~100 (2008), 한국법학원
  2. 이민호, "기업결합에서의 경쟁제한성 판단기준", 경쟁법연구, 13 (2006), 법문사
  3. 시장지배적 지위남용: 경제적 접근방법의 효용 및 한계, "이봉의", 한국공정거래조정원, ~ (2008)
  4. 이봉의, "포스코 판결과 방해남용의 향방", 경쟁저널, (140) (2008), 한국공정경쟁연합회
  5. 이황, "공정거래법상 단독의 위반행위 규제의 체계 - 시장지배적 지위 남용행위로서의 거래거절행위의 위법성, 그 본질과 판단기준", 사법, 1(5), pp.201~263 (2008), 사법발전재단
  6. 이효석, "혼합결합의 경쟁제한성 판단기준에 관한 연구", 박사, pp.2010
  7. 홍대식, "시장지배적 지위 남용행위의 판단기준 개선방안", 경쟁법연구, 21, pp.106~162 (2010), 한국경쟁법학회
  8. 홍대식, "「기업결합 심사기준」의 개정 내용에 대한 검토 - 경쟁제한성 판단기준을 중심으로-", 법조, 57(7), pp.148~204 (2008), 법조협회
  9. Calton, Dennis W., "Tying, Issues in competition law and policy" (2007), ABA
  10. Turner, Donald F., "Conglomerate mergers and section 7 of Clayton Act", Harvard Lae Review, 78, pp.1313~ (1965)
  11. Portfolio effects in conglomerate mergers, "OECD", ~, pp.DAFFE (2002), COMP(2002)5
  12. Steuer, Richard M., "Foreclosure, Issues in competition law and policy" (2007), ABA
  13. Kling, Michael, "Grundkurs Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht" (2004), C.H.Beck

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