AI 알고리즘 가격설정과 이른바 ‘알고리즘 묵시적 담합’ 문제에 대한 고찰
A Critique on the so-called ‘Algorithm-Driven Tacit Collusion’
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This article addressed some confusing problems of the so-called Algorithmims-Driven Tacit Collusion (ATC) - the hypothetical situation of Algorithmic Price Parallelism without sellers’ agreement (APP) in the online markets. Because pricing algorithm is a just tool rather than independent agent, there are no involvement of human behaviours in the process of APP. For this reason, it is not proper to use the term of conscious parallelisms or tacit collusion in the context of APP. Considering the realities of the online markets as well as the level of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and mathematics, it does not seem that APP may occur in the near future. Moreover APP cannot be regulated by competition law just because there are no human involvement in APP. It seems that the hypothetical scenario of ATC reflects a kind of AI Dystopia, such as the Singularity scenario, which can never be proved. In this sense, the ATC hypothesis seems like a science fiction rather than a theory.
Abstract
This article addressed some confusing problems of the so-called Algorithmims-Driven Tacit Collusion (ATC) - the hypothetical situation of Algorithmic Price Parallelism without sellers’ agreement (APP) in the online markets. Because pricing algorithm is a just tool rather than independent agent, there are no involvement of human behaviours in the process of APP. For this reason, it is not proper to use the term of conscious parallelisms or tacit collusion in the context of APP. Considering the realities of the online markets as well as the level of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and mathematics, it does not seem that APP may occur in the near future. Moreover APP cannot be regulated by competition law just because there are no human involvement in APP. It seems that the hypothetical scenario of ATC reflects a kind of AI Dystopia, such as the Singularity scenario, which can never be proved. In this sense, the ATC hypothesis seems like a science fiction rather than a theory.
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