알고리즘을 이용한 담합의 규제
Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion
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초록
The development of the digital economy has brought tremendous benefits to society such as the development of new goods and services, but the possibility of collusion increases due to high market transparency and increased frequency of transactions. Algorithms are sometimes used as an aid to the implementation of harmonization under traditional competition laws, but they are also intentionally used in pricing that is very similar to parallel behaviors that are not regulated by current competition laws, but resulting in anti-competitive consequences such as collusion. This paper looked at the need to redefine the concept of "agreement" while seeking ways in the framework of current law to regulate collusion by algorithms. Despite the obvious risks that algorithms pose to competition, regulations on them are still highly complex and uncertain. Once the current competition law is attempted, it should be based on a direction that ensures explainability and enables post-audit for the sake of transparency and reliability of the algorithm.
Abstract
The development of the digital economy has brought tremendous benefits to society such as the development of new goods and services, but the possibility of collusion increases due to high market transparency and increased frequency of transactions. Algorithms are sometimes used as an aid to the implementation of harmonization under traditional competition laws, but they are also intentionally used in pricing that is very similar to parallel behaviors that are not regulated by current competition laws, but resulting in anti-competitive consequences such as collusion. This paper looked at the need to redefine the concept of "agreement" while seeking ways in the framework of current law to regulate collusion by algorithms. Despite the obvious risks that algorithms pose to competition, regulations on them are still highly complex and uncertain. Once the current competition law is attempted, it should be based on a direction that ensures explainability and enables post-audit for the sake of transparency and reliability of the algorithm.
참고문헌 (13)
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- 최난설헌, "알고리즘을 통한 가격정보의 교환과 경쟁법적 평가", 경쟁법연구, 35, pp.215~241 (2017), 한국경쟁법학회
- 최난설헌, "AI 등을 활용한 사업자간 담합과 경쟁법의 대응", 경쟁법연구, 38, pp.83~109 (2018), 한국경쟁법학회[DOI]
- OECD, "Algorithms and Collusion Background Note by the Secretariat", ~ (2017)
- A. Ezrachi, "Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition(SSRN Electronic Journal; April 8, 2015)", University of Illinois Law Review (2017)
- A. Ezrachi, "Virtual Competition : The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy" (2016), Harvard University Press
- Michal S. Gal, "Algorithmic Consumers", Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 30 (2017)
- Michal S. Gal, "Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice", Michigan Technology Law Review, 25(1) (2018)
- Michal S. Gal, "Algorithms as Illegal Agreements", Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 34(1) (2019)
- Andreas Heinemann, "Can Computers Form Cartels? About the Need for European Institutions to Revise the Concertation Doctrine in the Information Age", Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 7(7) (2016)
- William H. Page, "Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act", Antitrust Law Journal, 81 (2017)