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1960년대 한⋅미 주둔군지위협정체결 협상과 성과:박정희 정부의 전략에 대한 미국의 인식

The Contracting Negotiation and Outcome of the ROK andthe US Status of Forces Agreement during 1960's:the US Perception about Park Jung-hee Administration's Strategy

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This article analyzed why the contracting negotiation of Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA) during 1960's had a conflict and reached an understanding. The Park Administration had a weak legitimacy due to getting power by the military coup, so at the beginning of their government, they totally tried to build favorable relationships with the United States(US). In fact, during the entire Park Administration period they had good relationships with the US such as the normalization between the Republic of Korea(ROK) and Japan, the Vietnam Dispatch of Korean Troops, the Deal of SOFA, and so on, even though there were conflicts with the US because of the North Korea's Provocation in 1968 and the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. If so, during favorable relationships between the two governments, why did the SOFA negotiation make a conflict? What was the Park administration's strategy to deal with the SOFA negotiation? How did the Park administration make a linkage between the normalization between the ROK and Japan, the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops? What was the effect of SOFA negotiation in this linkage? In these circumstances, how was the SOFA negotiation accomplished? This article focused on the SOFA negotiation after Park Jung-hee had succeeded in the transformation of the civilian government. After that, although the Park Administration had an inner conflict (Kim Chong-pil groups vs Anti-Kim Chong-pil groups), they had never changed the aims for a military security and an economic development. However, they definitely needed the support of the US to be successful in accomplishing a military security and an economic development. So they strategically approached the US by using the normalization between the ROK and Japan, as well as the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops. According to this article, after the success of transformation of the civilian government, the Park Administration more used the SOFA negotiation for a military security and an economic development than we assumed. In addition, they did not set an offensive position toward the US during the SOFA negotiation for maximizing the effect of the normalization between Korea and Japan, as well as the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops. Finally, the political process of the SOFA negotiation gave the Park Administration direct accomplishments (good results through visiting the US and the deal success) and indirect accomplishments (maximizing the effect of the normalization between the ROK and Japan, the Vietnam dispatch of the ROK troops). In the same manner, it gave the US direct accomplishments (substantial authority over the SOFA) and indirect accomplishments (support for the Park presidential election). In sum, the SOFA negotiation and its deal was a win-win strategy for the Park Administration and the US.

Abstract

This article analyzed why the contracting negotiation of Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA) during 1960's had a conflict and reached an understanding. The Park Administration had a weak legitimacy due to getting power by the military coup, so at the beginning of their government, they totally tried to build favorable relationships with the United States(US). In fact, during the entire Park Administration period they had good relationships with the US such as the normalization between the Republic of Korea(ROK) and Japan, the Vietnam Dispatch of Korean Troops, the Deal of SOFA, and so on, even though there were conflicts with the US because of the North Korea's Provocation in 1968 and the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. If so, during favorable relationships between the two governments, why did the SOFA negotiation make a conflict? What was the Park administration's strategy to deal with the SOFA negotiation? How did the Park administration make a linkage between the normalization between the ROK and Japan, the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops? What was the effect of SOFA negotiation in this linkage? In these circumstances, how was the SOFA negotiation accomplished? This article focused on the SOFA negotiation after Park Jung-hee had succeeded in the transformation of the civilian government. After that, although the Park Administration had an inner conflict (Kim Chong-pil groups vs Anti-Kim Chong-pil groups), they had never changed the aims for a military security and an economic development. However, they definitely needed the support of the US to be successful in accomplishing a military security and an economic development. So they strategically approached the US by using the normalization between the ROK and Japan, as well as the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops. According to this article, after the success of transformation of the civilian government, the Park Administration more used the SOFA negotiation for a military security and an economic development than we assumed. In addition, they did not set an offensive position toward the US during the SOFA negotiation for maximizing the effect of the normalization between Korea and Japan, as well as the Vietnam Dispatch of the ROK Troops. Finally, the political process of the SOFA negotiation gave the Park Administration direct accomplishments (good results through visiting the US and the deal success) and indirect accomplishments (maximizing the effect of the normalization between the ROK and Japan, the Vietnam dispatch of the ROK troops). In the same manner, it gave the US direct accomplishments (substantial authority over the SOFA) and indirect accomplishments (support for the Park presidential election). In sum, the SOFA negotiation and its deal was a win-win strategy for the Park Administration and the US.

참고문헌 (28)

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