아이젠하워 행정부의 정전구상과 한국군의 역할

Abstract

This study analyzes the armistice plans conceived by the United States at the conclusion of the Korean War, identifies the primary targets for deterrence, and examines the roles expected of the South Korean military in this context. The Chinese forces initially inflicted heavy losses on U.S. troops and increased their military efficiency during the armistice negotiations. As the Eisenhower administration resumed armistice talks with the Communist side, it suspended its previously planned expansionist war policy (NSC 147) and, through NSC 154/1, devised an armistice plan targeting China. Later, in the Geneva political negotiations, the U.S. considered NSC 157, which aimed for a neutralized reunification plan for Korea, but ultimately recognized its impracticality. In this approach, the U.S. identified China as the main counterpart in negotiations and as the primary target for deterrence. The U.S. government ultimately pursued NSC 170/1, which comprehensively considered both long-term and realistic objectives. Depending on the various armistice plans, the U.S. held different expectations for the role of the South Korean military. However, after finalizing NSC 170/1, the U.S. regarded the South Korean military as a force to conduct ground operations against Communist forces, primarily composed of Chinese troops, in cooperation with U.S. forces. Pursuing NSC 170/1, the U.S. decided that if Chinese forces disrupted the armistice order, it would conduct ground, naval, and air operations on the Korean Peninsula and strike targets in mainland China and Manchuria with nuclear weapons. This approach also aligned with the economic priorities outlined in NSC 162/2.