언어, 수사술 그리고 인문학

Abstract

The contemporary cultural atmosphere in the Western world may be characterized most adequately through its antagonism to their own essentialist-realist tradition of thought. In this antagonism is comprised a protreptic to tolerance and pluralism, a protreptic that contrasts clearly with the dogmatic attitude inherent in the essentialist-realist standpoint of traditional philosophy. This situation reminds us of the confrontation between philosophy and rhetoric enacted by Plato in the ancient times. Targeting Gorgias as a spokesman of the opposite camp Plato did everything in his power to undermine the relativism a là Gorgias in the belief that rhetoric rises and falls with the cause expounded by Gorgias. Now that after more than two thousands years anti-essentialism and consequently relativism are gaining ground, the achievement of the modern followers of Gorgias seems to encourage us, friends of rhetoric, in our hope for the renaissance of rhetoric. But at this point we should raise a question how far rhetoric can get along with the relativism. Though it is true that a relativistic and pluralistic attitude toward verities matches well with the spirit of rhetoric, there is no logically necessary relationship through which both should be connected to each other. Rhetoric does not need to be supported by any special kind of philosophical cause. One can say that rhetoric is neutral in this sense; Rhetoric can give support to a very stiffened form of essentialism as well as to an anarchistic anti-essentialism. The misunderstanding about the insincerity of rhetoric with respect to verities can be corrected, if one recalls that rhetoric at the time of its birth was understood as an art of persuasion. Persuasion comprises two functions, namely 'docere' and 'movere'. For too long time too much emphasis has been given to 'movere'. However, without giving just so much emphasis to the other indispensable side of persuasion, 'docere', we cannot rebuild rhetoric as a desirable kind of art. 'docere' could not be 'docere', if it should ignore the importance of truths. What distinguishes rhetoric from philosophy is not the noncommitment to truths, but its interest in the pragmatics of communication in the life world.