미 의회의 신속처리절차(Fast-Track Procedure)에 대한 고찰
Investigating the Fast-Track Procedure as the Legislative Institution
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본 연구는 신속처리절차(fast-track procedure 또는 authority)를 비통상적인(unconventional) 입법절차라는 관점에서 의원들의 표결행위를 분석하고 기존 이론들의 타당성을 점검하 였다. 분석결과에 따르면 무역에 관한 신속처리절차가 무역자유화에 대한 법안이라고 가정하는 연구결과의 경우 심각한 오류를 가져올 수 있다. 또한 선행연구들이 신속처리 절차를 의회와 행정부의 관계 속에서만 분석하였지만 실제 신속처리절차는 의회 내에 서 더 큰 영향이 있다는 것이 본 연구의 주장이다. 신속처리절차는 비통상적인 입법절 차로서, 절차가 적용되는 정책영역에서 의회 내부의 권력균형을 변화시키는 효과가 있 다. 이로 인해 영향력을 행사할 수 없게 된 의원들은 정책선호와 관계없이 신속처리절 차를 반대하는 경향을 나타내고 것으로 관측되었다. 분석의 촛점이 된 미 의회의 무역정 책에 관한 신속처리권한의 경우, 표결행위가 세입위원회(Ways and Means committee)와 규칙위원회(Rules committee)의 영역전쟁(turf war)의 성격을 띠고 있는 것도 이러한 주장을 지지한다. 더불어 신속처리절차로 인해 자신이 가진 기득권에 가장 큰 영향을 받는 위원회 리더십의 경우 신속처리절차에 반대했다는 것, 그리고 무역이슈가 중요해 질수록 의원들이 자신의 가진 영향력의 기반 또는 영역(turf)를 지키려고 했다는 사실 또한 이러한 관점이 타당성이 있다는 것을 시사한다.
Abstract
While the fast-track procedure has been analyzed as the tool that helps the President in trade negotiation with other countries and facilitate free-trade, the previous studies neglected the most important aspect of the fast-track procedure. That is, it deprives the main source of power and prestige from certain members of Congress. This paper analyzes the fast-track procedure for trade agreements from different perspective that emphasizes unconventionality of it as the legislative procedure. The fast-track procedure for trade agreement intrudes on the power of committees to control their agendas and schedules and, most importantly, reduces the authority of majority leaders and the Rules committee to set the floor agendas, schedule, and craft special rules for floor consideration. Not surprisingly, it disturbs the power-balance within Congress that will concern many legislators. From the perspective that the fast-track procedures are the outcome of turf war within Congress, the paper performed empirical examinations on how members of the House voted on the fast-track bills.
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