Can Social Clause be Hampered by Active Green Trade Union Movements?
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Core labour standards are shown to domestically weaken when large firms are faced with active green trade union movement in the bargaining process. The study presents that trade unions’ eco-friendly movements are socially responsible acts and based on the collective bargaining power, which is one of the core standards of the unions. This United Nations-led strategy is particularly useful in improving the environment when trade unions join the movements with a cooperative negotiation strategy such as ‘pattern bargaining.’ However, such active green trade unions have adverse effects on their firms’ profit-making structure due to higher wages and lower production that result from negotiations. This drives firms to seek strategic and political solutions. Lobbying, for example, by the firms are presented as a feasible way to weaken core standards that are being implemented. This implies that strong bargaining power can influence and alleviate environmental problems and improve social welfare, but may work against the value of labour standards as social clauses.
Abstract
Core labour standards are shown to domestically weaken when large firms are faced with active green trade union movement in the bargaining process. The study presents that trade unions’ eco-friendly movements are socially responsible acts and based on the collective bargaining power, which is one of the core standards of the unions. This United Nations-led strategy is particularly useful in improving the environment when trade unions join the movements with a cooperative negotiation strategy such as ‘pattern bargaining.’ However, such active green trade unions have adverse effects on their firms’ profit-making structure due to higher wages and lower production that result from negotiations. This drives firms to seek strategic and political solutions. Lobbying, for example, by the firms are presented as a feasible way to weaken core standards that are being implemented. This implies that strong bargaining power can influence and alleviate environmental problems and improve social welfare, but may work against the value of labour standards as social clauses.
참고문헌 (13)
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