The economic analysis of national and global interest politics for international environmental standards
The Economic Analysis of National and Global Interest Politics for International Environmental Standards
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This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government's decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its scope of research to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade between 2 small open economies, we compare the political equilibrium environmental standards in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental interest group. Although the conventional finding suggests that cooperative bargaining between the two countries can attain the globally optimal level of the standard, the paper rather explains that the cooperation between the national interest groups and the hybrid case also generate the stricter standard then national interest politics usually do.
Abstract
This study presents the political economics models to explore the political landscape of special interest groups influencing the government's decision making process for implementing international environmental standard. Starting with the popular menu-auction types of lobbying frameworks in the literature, the study extends its scope of research to multi-principal and multi-agency based international interest group politics and its hybrid case in order to bring the interaction of the relevant interest politics to the fore. Within a specific factor model of international trade between 2 small open economies, we compare the political equilibrium environmental standards in different institutional frameworks which can be feasible in the sense of recently growing role of environmental interest group. Although the conventional finding suggests that cooperative bargaining between the two countries can attain the globally optimal level of the standard, the paper rather explains that the cooperation between the national interest groups and the hybrid case also generate the stricter standard then national interest politics usually do.
참고문헌 (25)
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