Lobbies Competition and Bilateral International Environmental Agreements
2
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper analyzes two small open economies that share a natural environment and consider an environmental agreement between them. The two governments do not merely maximize general welfare in their respective countries, but also pick a policy partially in response to their internal “functionally specialized” industrial and environmental lobbies. This paper provides the conditions under which an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) between those two countries could be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium with or without special interests’ pressures.
Abstract
This paper analyzes two small open economies that share a natural environment and consider an environmental agreement between them. The two governments do not merely maximize general welfare in their respective countries, but also pick a policy partially in response to their internal “functionally specialized” industrial and environmental lobbies. This paper provides the conditions under which an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) between those two countries could be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium with or without special interests’ pressures.
참고문헌 (22)
- Aidt, T., "Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy", Journal of Public Economics, 69, pp.1~16 (1998)
- The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Climate Agreements, "Altamirano-Cabrera, J.", NCCR, ~, pp.Research Paper 2007 (2007), 03
- Anderson, T., "Government Failure – The Cause of Global Environmental Mismanagement", Ecological Economics, 4, pp.215~236 (1991)
- Barrett, S., "Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements", Oxford Economic Papers, 46, pp.878~894 (1994)
- Barrett, S., "Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade", Journal of Public Economics, 54, pp.325~338 (1994)
- Barrett, S., "The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements", Resource and Energy Economics, 19, pp.345~361 (1997)
- Barrett, S., "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-making", Environmental and Resource Economics, 11(3), pp.317~333
- Bernheim, B., "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(1), pp.1~31 (1986)
- Buchholz, W., "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp.175~195 (2005)
- Carraro, C., "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment", Journal of Public Economics, 52, pp.309~328 (1993)
- Conconi, P., "Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies", Journal of International Economics, 59, pp.399~422 (2003)
- Fredriksson, P., "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, pp.44~58 (1997)
- Fredriksson, P., "Environmentalism, Democracy, and Pollution Control", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49, pp.343~365 (2005)
- Grossman, G., "Protection for Sale", The American Economic Review, 84(4), pp.833~850 (1994)
- Grossman, G., "The Politics of Free-trade Agreements", The American Economic Review, 85(4), pp.667~690 (1995)
- Grossman, G., "Special Interest Politics" (2001), MIT Press
- Guttman, J., "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior", The American Economic Review, 68, pp.251~255 (1978)
- Political Influence on Non-cooperative International Climate Policy, "Habla, W.", University of Bern, Switzerland, ~ (2011)
- Hoel, M., "Global Environmental Problems: The Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by one Country", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, pp.55~70 (1991)
- National Electorates and International Agreements, "Kemp, H.", ~ (2008)
- Putnam, R., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games", International Organization, 42, pp.427~460 (1998)
- Siqueira, K., "International Externalities, Strategic Interaction, and Domestic Politics", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45, pp.674~691 (2003)