신산업 진입규제 엄격성의 정치경제학적 결정모형에 관한 연구: 로비모형을 중심으로

Abstract

It becomes more frequent that technological innovations in new industries can’t proliferate in relevant industries or lead to national economic growth mainly due to counterparts’ resistance and harsh conflicts among interest groups. To provide a framework for better understanding of these current situations in political economic perspective, this research attempted the theoretical modelling. Based on the competitive lobbying of different interest groups this research analyzed the political economic process determining the stringency of entry regulations in new industries. This study constructed the research model basically following the two-stage equlibrium game and considering different interest groups of an existing firm, an entrant firm of a new industry, and consumers. In addition, a government is also considered to deternmine the policy of entry regulations. As a result, it was found that the politically determined stringency level of entry regulations in new industries is higher than the one for maximizing the social welfare. Assuming the diverse preferences of the government, this study also compared multiple cases showing different levels of stringency. Furthermore, a comparative static analysis has been conducted to see the relationship between the stringency level in a political equilibrium and the parameters in the model. The result showed that in the case of the government putting more emphasis on the maximization of social welfare, entry regulations could be less stricter than the other. And it was also found that in the case of the government focusing on the political contribution from the entrant firm of a new industry, entry regulations could be stricter.