Cournot Conjectures with Asymmetric Information under Uncertainty
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper introduces the simple and standard Cournot duopoly model facing the asymmetric situation in which firm 1 has partial information and firm 2 has perfect information on the cost function of their rival under different risk-taking behaviors. We present two types of risk-taking behaviors of firms to analyze this asymmetric situation. First, when both firms are risk-neutral, compared with the results that each firm has perfect information on its rival’s cost function, the optimal output level of firm 2 does not change; however, that of firm 1 can increase or decrease. Second, we consider that firm 1 is risk-averse and firm 2 is risk-neutral. We find that firm 1’s optimal output level decreases and that of firm 2 increases under this kind of asymmetric information, compared with the results in the case in which both firms are risk-neutral. Further, we find that firms’ optimal strategies depend on their risk-taking behaviors.
Abstract
This paper introduces the simple and standard Cournot duopoly model facing the asymmetric situation in which firm 1 has partial information and firm 2 has perfect information on the cost function of their rival under different risk-taking behaviors. We present two types of risk-taking behaviors of firms to analyze this asymmetric situation. First, when both firms are risk-neutral, compared with the results that each firm has perfect information on its rival’s cost function, the optimal output level of firm 2 does not change; however, that of firm 1 can increase or decrease. Second, we consider that firm 1 is risk-averse and firm 2 is risk-neutral. We find that firm 1’s optimal output level decreases and that of firm 2 increases under this kind of asymmetric information, compared with the results in the case in which both firms are risk-neutral. Further, we find that firms’ optimal strategies depend on their risk-taking behaviors.
참고문헌 (21)
- Clarke, R. N., "Collusion and the incentives for information sharing", Bell Journal of Economics, 14, pp.383~394 (1983)
- Clarke, R. N., "Duopolist don’t wish to share information", Economics Letters, 14, pp.33~36 (1983)
- Doyle, M. P., "Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry", Journal of Political Economy, 107, pp.1324~1364 (1999)
- Gal-Or, R., "Information sharing in oligopoly", Econometrica, 53, pp.329~343 (1985)
- Gal-Or, R., "Information transmission-cournot and Bertrand equilibria", Review of Economic Studies, 53, pp.85~92 (1986)
- Gehrig, T., "Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs", European Economic Review, 51(1), pp.77~99 (2007)
- Hwang, H. S., "Optimal information acquisition for heterogeneous duopoly firms", Journal of Economic Theory, 59, pp.385~402 (1993)
- Jin, J. Y., "A test for information sharing in Cournot oligopoly", Information Economics and Policy, 8, pp.75~86 (1996)
- Kirby, A., "Trade associations as information exchange mechanism", The RAND Journal of Economics, 19, pp.138~146 (1988)
- Kultti, K., "Demand uncertainty in cournot-duopoly", Liiketaloudellinen Aikakauskirja, 47, pp.24~32 (1998)
- Li, L., "Cournot oligopoly with information sharing", The Rand Journal of Economics, 16, pp.521~536 (1985)
- Malueg, D. A., "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp.119~136 (1996)
- Malueg, D. A., "Distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, pp.785~797 (1998)
- Novshek, W., "Fulfilled expectations Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release", Bell Journal of Economics, 13, pp.214~218 (1982)
- Ryu, S., "Conjectures between two Cournot firms with symmetric information and their risk-taking behaviours", Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies, 54, pp.223~234 (2017)
- Sakai, Y., "Information sharing in oligopoly: Overview and evaluation. Part I. alternative models with a common risk", Keio Economic Studies, 27, pp.17~41 (1990)
- Sakai, Y., "Information sharing in oligopoly: Overview and evaluation. Part II. Private risks and oligopoly models", Keio Economic Studies, 28, pp.51~71 (1991)
- Sakai, Y., "Oligopoly, information and welfare", Journal of Economics, 49, pp.3~24 (1989)
- Sandmo, A., "On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty", American Economic Review, 61, pp.65~73 (1971)
- Shapiro, C., "Exchange of cost Information in oligopoly", Review of Economic Studies, 53, pp.433~446 (1986)
- Vives, X., "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand", Journal of Economic Theory, 34, pp.71~91 (1984)