“양순음역(陽順陰逆), 승극출겁(乘隙出劫)” - 명(明) 가정(嘉靖) 연간 상서(湘西) 지역의 묘족(苗族) 반란과 국가 권력

Abstract

This paper explores how the collapse of the chieftain system, which was established through the insurrections of ethnic minorities in western Hunan Province in the early Ming dynasty and maintained subsequently, is reflected in the behavior of tribal chiefs in a series of insurrections. As seen in the process of establishing the position of squad leader in the Wuzhai and Ganziping areas and the chieftain system inaugurated in a very incomplete form in the early Ming period, there was no more than a grand chieftain-oriented policy similar to a pacification commissioner. This is why the Ming dynasty failed to effectively meet the military challenges against state power which were raised in a variety of ways by sub-chieftains and the wild Miao in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. The Miao insurrections which occurred during the rule of the Jiajing Emperor clearly reveal the union of the government army and tribal chiefs, and the periodical secession of tribal chiefs who were apt to change their positions in accordance with their interests. Further, some tribal chiefs claimed their right to hostages to the Ming government army, or to the estate of rebels after they had suppressed the insurrection. These developments suggest that the tribal chiefs at that time had already established their power in the areas of ethnic minorities. The Ming dynasty provided cash to them in order to suppress the rebels, which eventually allowed the tribal chiefs to fill their pockets. Even though the Ming dynasty was clearly aware of such behavior by tribal chiefs and the serious problems of the system, the government was unswervingly devoted to assuming military measures without arriving at tangible and fundamental solutions. The lack of commitment by tribal chiefs led to the Ming dynasty’s failure to suppress the revolts completely, which caused insurrections to occur periodically in these regions. From the middle of the Ming period, the dynasty had been endeavoring to establish and expand the military facilities, but this seemed to be no more than a passive defense strategy. In this light, we must remember that the frontier wall, which was built during this period, was not only a defense line but also a type of military border line intended to evade their control over the wild Miao. Considering that Western Hunan Province was a region with an ethnic mixture of wild Miao, tame Miao, and Han people, we can observe that during the Ming dynasty the province was certain to be in disorder in various contexts. It was essentially impossible, therefore, to rule this region of diversity only through the uniform chieftain system. Consequently, it is meaningful that Liu Yingzhong, who served as the prefect of Chenzhou in 1680, while assuming a careful attitude toward the reconstruction of the Frontier Wall insisted that the matter of the Frontier Wall was not merely that of a single place in Chenzhou, but of the Huguang region. The eventual reason why the Yongzheng Emperor took the step of extensively carrying out the “gaitu guiliu” policy following the Kangxi Emperor’s having assumed a very careful attitude toward it must be, above all, his reconsideration of not only the Huguang area but also the areas of the ethnic minorities. For that reason, the gaitu guiliu policy seems to have been a strategy of transition from the multi-spectrum of tribal chiefs, guards, wild Miao, tame Miao, and Han people, which is implied in the chieftain system, to the single spectrum of ethnic minorities vs. Han people. However, this transition requires closer examination in the future.